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Abstract
Democratic norms suggest that voters should support candidates with whom
they agree on the important issues of the day. When voters perceive dis-
agreement between themselves and their preferred candidates, they often
experience cognitive dissonance and react by engaging in motivated reason-
ing, changing their issue positions (via persuasion) and candidate perceptions
(via projection) to rationalize their candidate preferences. Although moti-
vated reasoning has been studied extensively in political psychology, most of
these studies have been limited to single issues and single motivated reason-
ing processes, making it impossible to generalize about how individual voters
approach cognitive dissonance in complex campaign environments when mul-
tiple issues and processes are in play. I develop a multi-issue, multi-process
theory of motivated reasoning that accounts for the full range of tools vot-
ers have for justifying their discordant candidate preferences with respect to
issue proximity. Using panel surveys from three U.S. presidential elections,
I demonstrate that voters tend to spread their motivated reasoning efforts
across issues and across processes. These motivated reasoning strategies are
both more effective at reducing cognitive dissonance and more cognitively
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efficient, combining many small adjustments to voters’ issue positions and
candidate perceptions that add up to a substantial reduction in perceived
voter-candidate disagreement. These findings have mixed implications for
citizen competence and democratic accountability: multi-issue, multi-process
motivated reasoning is less distortive of voters’ political cognition than its
single-issue or single-process counterparts, but it is also more intractable due
to its lack of reliance on any one issue or process to rationalize candidate
preferences.
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The Dynamics of Perceived Voter-Candidate
Agreement
The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions.
—Leonardo da Vinci
On July 21, 2016, real estate billionaire Donald J. Trump accepted the
Republican nomination for President of the United States at the GOP’s na-
tional convention in Cleveland. To get there, he had to defeat 16 primary
opponents and an increasingly vocal “Never Trump” faction which sought to
prevent him from becoming the Republican standard-bearer in 2016. Among
the charges levied by Never-Trumpers was the claim that Trump, a former
Democrat, was out of step with Republican voters on important political is-
sues. From Planned Parenthood to eminent domain to the role of government
in healthcare and education, Trump was pilloried as insufficiently conserva-
tive (Hensch 2015; Krauthammer 2016; Limbaugh 2016). Even right-wing
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news site Breitbart, which eventually became one of Trump’s staunchest
defenders, questioned his conservative credentials as late as January 2016
(Shapiro 2016).
One week later, in Philadelphia, former Secretary of State Hillary Rod-
ham Clinton was nominated by the Democrats as their 2016 presidential
candidate. Like Trump, Clinton had endured an unexpectedly long and ar-
duous campaign for the nomination – a far cry from the coronation many had
anticipated. Though Clinton faced fewer competitors than Trump, she was
forced to duel Vermont senator Bernie Sanders, a curmudgeonly democratic
socialist who vexed the Clinton campaign with a record number of individ-
ual donors and fervent grassroots support. Sanders relentlessly lambasted
Clinton for being cozy with big banks, hawkish on foreign policy, and insuffi-
ciently committed to progressive causes such as single-payer healthcare and
tuition-free college. Although he never truly threatened Clinton’s primary
bid, Sanders’s presence created a stark contrast that led many to judge Clin-
ton as not being progressive, liberal, or even Democratic enough to lead the
Democratic ticket (Bragman 2016; Kirchick 2016; MacArthur 2016; O’Hehir
2016).
Thus, as the United States shifted gears from the primary to the general
election, supporters of both major-party nominees encountered areas of dis-
agreement between themselves and their preferred candidates. Conservative
Republicans who settled on Trump found themselves backing an ex-Democrat
still clinging to some of his liberal views. Some liberal Democrats – espe-
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cially those who preferred Sanders in the primary – regarded Clinton as a
consolation prize who lacked their progressive stances. Meanwhile, moderate
and independent voters whose issue positions did not neatly fit either can-
didate’s platform were bound to disagree at least somewhat with whomever
they chose to support. Across the ideological spectrum, many Americans
saw themselves as out of sync with their preferred candidates on important
policy questions – and with Election Day approaching, they faced increasing
pressure to agree in an intensely polarized campaign environment.
Issue Positions and Democratic Representation
The 2016 presidential matchup of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump demon-
strates a perennial problem of elections in representative democracies: for
any diverse electorate, it is impossible to select two candidates such that
every voter will agree completely with one or the other on the issues of the
day. Some will prefer one candidate’s positions on some issues and the other
candidate’s positions on other issues. Some will encounter issues on which
they disagree with both candidates equally. A felicitous few will find that
they share every one of their preferred candidate’s positions from the get-go
(the issue-voting equivalent of “love at first sight”), but most will perceive
at least some gaps between where they and their preferred candidates stand
on pressing policy matters.
The existence of these voter-candidate gaps does not by any means pre-
clude democratic representation. So long as voters privilege politicians whose
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issue positions most closely resemble their own, election- and reelection-
minded candidates will be incentivized to stick close to public opinion, lest
they be outflanked by challengers with more popular views (Downs 1957;
Mayhew 1974). When public opinion changes, politicians who are unable or
unwilling to adapt to the new zeitgeist will be replaced with ones who can and
will. In this way, voters maximize the quality of their issue representation
by holding candidates accountable for their platforms.
The linchpin of this accountability mechanism is that voters’ issue po-
sitions and perceptions of the candidates’ issue positions drive – and are
not driven by – their candidate preferences. It is therefore unsurprising that
public opinion scholars have reacted with dismay to findings that suggest the
relationship works in reverse. Voters often begin with candidate preferences
and, wanting to agree with the candidates they have chosen, adopt said can-
didates’ issue positions in a process known as persuasion (Page and Jones
1979). They also frequently engage in projection, in which they maintain their
own issue positions but selectively perceive their preferred or non-preferred
candidates as agreeing or disagreeing with them, respectively (Markus and
Converse 1979). Each of these processes narrows the relative distance voters
perceive between themselves and their preferred candidates, potentially yield-
ing results that are observationally equivalent to issue voting without voters
having to consider issue proximity when forming candidate preferences.
Of course, issue voting is not the only method by which voters can or
should hold candidates accountable; in many cases economic conditions, can-
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didate characteristics, or other factors may be legitimate criteria on which
to base one’s vote. But there is an important distinction between forming
candidate preferences using non-issue criteria on the one hand and reverse-
engineering issue positions and candidate perceptions to rationalize those
preferences on the other. In the former case, issues are dormant considera-
tions that could be invoked in the future to judge how well voters are being
represented. In the latter, the accountability mechanism for constraining
the actions of politicians is weakened or even nullified by voters becoming
blind to areas of disagreement. To the extent that voters’ issue positions
and candidate perceptions are distorted by their desires to agree with their
preferred candidates, citizen competence and the quality of the democratic
representation that rests upon it are jeopardized.
Understanding How Voters Close the Gap
To determine how effective voters are at evaluating politicians based on their
policy platforms, we need to know how much their conceptualizations of pol-
icy space are distorted by selective interpretation of information to yield a
particular conclusion – in this case, the conclusion that their candidate pref-
erences are justified with respect to the issues. The extent to which this
perceptual bias influences voters’ issue positions and candidate perceptions
has major implications for how we view voter decision-making. At one ex-
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treme, voters’ issue positions and candidate perceptions are fixed,1 allowing
them to triangulate the most proximate candidate in an unbiased fashion.
At the other extreme, issue correspondence is purely an afterthought: voters
freely and capriciously change where they see themselves and the candidates
in policy space in order to rationalize predetermined candidate preferences.
In between are various levels of citizen competence where voters engage in
some justifying behavior regarding voter-candidate agreement, but only up
to a point.
To accurately place the electorate on this spectrum, we must answer this
question: how do voters approach the problem of perceived voter-candidate
disagreement? When voters perceive gaps between themselves and their
preferred candidates on the issues, what coping strategies do they invoke,
how effective are these strategies at alleviating gaps, and how much do they
distort voters’ conceptualizations of policy space in the process?
Consider a hypothetical Trump supporter in the 2016 general election
campaign. Initially drawn to the tycoon’s business experience and outsider
status, she gradually becomes more cognizant of his policy platform as elec-
tion news coverage intensifies. On some issues, she sees herself and Trump
as being of one mind. On others, Trump’s position seems too conservative
or too liberal for her taste but is still a better match for her own stance that
the position she perceives Clinton as taking. More unsettling are the issues
1Or, at the very least, they change only in response to new circumstances unrelated to
candidate preference.
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on which she finds herself agreeing with Clinton much more so than with
Trump. This last set of issues, if they are of non-negligible importance to
her, contribute the most to her nagging doubts about whether supporting
Trump is the right choice.
How should we expect our conflicted Trump supporter to handle this sit-
uation? Obviously she would prefer the perceived gap between herself and
Trump to be smaller – at least smaller than the gap she perceives between
herself and Clinton. But how to make it so? Would she abdicate her prob-
lematic positions and adopt new ones more consistent with Trump’s? Would
she convince herself that Trump holds positions closer to – or Clinton po-
sitions farther away from – hers than she originally believed? Would she
perhaps invoke both tactics to some extent? If she did make these adjust-
ments, would they be large or small? Would they be limited to a few issues
or spread out across the full gamut of policy questions? How much would her
perceptions of policy space be altered in service of perceived voter-candidate
agreement? Is there some threshold beyond which these alterations would
become so cognitively demanding that she would give up on rationalizing her
support for Trump and defect to Clinton?
Despite years of political science scholarship on persuasion and projection,
the answers to these questions remain for the most part unknown. The reason
for this lapse is a fundamental disconnect between the rationalization we
want to understand and the methods we use to study it. Campaigns present
voters with many issues and the opportunity to adjust where they stand and
7
where they believe the candidates stand on each of them. By contrast, most
research designs attempt to isolate and analyze adjustment on a single issue,
often treating either voters’ issue positions or their candidate perceptions
as fixed and therefore preventing voters from invoking either persuasion or
projection, respectively.
Focusing on either persuasion or projection on a single issue allows for
simple, clear observations about the process and in question, but at the ex-
pense of verisimilitude. Campaigns are complicated affairs, and all aspects
of voters’ conceptualizations of policy space can vary simultaneously. Study-
ing how voters engage in, for example, projection on the issue of government
spending when persuasion on that issue is off the table and no other issues are
considered tells us something about political psychology, but this knowledge
only applies to actual campaigns if we assume that voters behave the same
way when they can be persuaded or project on the full range of issues. This
is a precarious assumption to make. It is quite possible that the artificial
constraints of single-issue, single-process studies are so constricting that any
observations barely resemble how voters justify their candidate preferences
in real electoral environments. As a result, the findings yielded by this body
of research do not adequately answer the question of how voters rationalize
perceived voter-candidate disagreement in complex campaign environments.
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Persuasion and Projection through a Motivated Reasoning
Lens
If we want to know how effective voters are at rationalizing their candidate
preferences and how much that rationalization impedes democratic account-
ability, we need to study voters in their natural habitat: complex campaign
environments where they are free to invoke persuasion and projection on more
than one issue. We also need a theory of how voters use these processes that
corresponds to the logic of proximity voting – specifically, a theory in which
what matters is relative agreement with one’s candidate not on any particular
issue but rather across the range of issues featured in a campaign.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and test such a theory. I
argue that persuasion and projection are best understood as types of direc-
tional motivated reasoning – that is, they are forms of information processing
that are biased in favor of confirming preconceptions rather than reaching
accurate assessments (Kunda 1990). Voters motivatedly reason about their
issue positions and candidate perceptions to reduce the cognitive dissonance
they experience from supporting one candidate while feeling closer to another
candidate on the issues.
Motivated reasoning, like all information processing, requires cognitive
effort, a scarce resource which voters prefer not to spend prodigally on po-
litical decisions that affect their lives tangentially at most. In terms of
persuasion and projection, large adjustments to one’s positions or percep-
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tions of the candidates’ positions require greater cognitive effort than small
ones: changing one’s mind slightly on an issue entails less counter-arguing
and re-interpretation than drastically redefining one’s stance. Given the op-
portunity, voters will gravitate to cognitively efficient motivated reasoning
strategies – i.e., those that consist of small self- and candidate adjustments
rather than large ones.2
In elections where multiple issues and multiple processes are in play, vot-
ers have cognitively efficient motivated reasoning strategies that single-issue,
single-process theories and studies fail to capture. Specifically, the ability
to invoke both persuasion and projection to justify candidate preferences re-
moves the need for voters to make major adjustments to any particular issue
position or candidate perception. In most cases, voters can effectively reduce
perceived voter-candidate disagreement through a combination of small ad-
justments. Tweaking one’s conceptualization of policy space here and there
is easier to mentally justify than drastically altering one’s own position or
perception of a candidate’s position on an issue. By themselves, these minor
tweaks do little to reduce the cognitive dissonance arising from incongruent
candidate preferences, but together they can add up to a sizable effect on
voters’ perceptions of their relative proximity to their preferred candidates
2Here, and throughout the dissertation, I refer to voters’ combined invocations of persua-
sion and projection as “strategies” for semantic convenience. Use of this term is not meant
to imply that motivated reasoning is entirely or predominantly a conscious undertaking.
Decomposing motivated reasoning into its conscious and subconscious components is a
formidable task for political psychologists, but the theory articulated in these pages is




The possibility that voters reconcile perceived disagreements with their
preferred candidates through multi-issue, multi-process motivated reasoning
strategies has both positive and negative implications for our understanding
of citizen competence and democratic accountability. On the one hand, vot-
ers’ proclivity for small steps rather than giant leaps means that their issue
positions and candidate perceptions are not completely distorted in the pur-
suit of voter-candidate agreement. Attitudes and beliefs about policy space
exhibit some inertia, and many of the most prolific motivated reasoners are
only “fudging the numbers” a little bit here and there. This should be en-
couraging for political scientists who associate attitude stability with citizen
competence: voters might be biased perceptors of where they and the can-
didates stand on the issues, but their biases do not seem to be pulling them
too far away from reality.
On the other hand, the diffusion of this rationalizing behavior across is-
sues and processes means that motivated reasoning about policy positions is
more potent than existing political psychology scholarship suggests. Single-
issue, single-process studies often demonstrate conditions or manipulations
that reduce voters’ tendencies to engage in persuasion or projection, with
the implicit hope that these mitigating factors might somehow be wielded
to promote better voter decision-making. However, in light of the fact that
voters spread out their motivated reasoning efforts into many small steps,
these potential boosts to citizen competence appear more like artifacts of
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constrained research designs than promising future interventions for the bet-
terment of the electorate. Imbuing voters with stable issue positions, elim-
inating candidate ambiguity through education or incentives, or clarifying
where everyone stands on a particular issue all might make certain types of
motivated reasoning more difficult, but none is a silver bullet. The very same
traits of voters’ rationalization strategies that make them less distortive of
their conceptualizations of policy space also make motivated reasoning more
intractable.
Plan for the Dissertation
Although motivated reasoning about issue positions has not yet been ex-
plored from the multi-issue, multi-process perspective described above, a
great deal of scholarly ink has been spilled on voters’ proclivity to miti-
gate cognitive dissonance through persuasion and projection. In Chapter
2, I summarize the conclusions drawn from this body of research and their
relevance to citizen competence and democratic responsiveness. Acknowl-
edging that these past studies offer many valuable lessons about how voters
rationalize their candidate preferences, I explain in detail why this research
agenda, notwithstanding these contributions, has heretofore fallen short of
adequately illustrating voters’ overall motivated reasoning strategies due to
its reliance on single-issue, single-process research designs that fail to capture
the unconstrained nature of real campaigns.
A multi-issue, multi-process theory of motivated reasoning about candi-
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dates and issues is put forth in Chapter 3. Grounded in a motivated reasoning
framework, I develop a set of expectations about how voters rationalize their
candidate preferences in complex campaign environments where persuasion
and projection are simultaneously available as motivated reasoning tactics.
Key to this theory is the fact that, by spreading out their motivated reason-
ing efforts across issues and processes, voters are able to achieve major re-
ductions in perceived voter-candidate disagreement (and therefore cognitive
dissonance) through a combination of small, cognitively cheap adjustments.
I explain how multi-issue, multi-process approaches to motivated reasoning
in policy space are not only possible but also preferable in light of voters’
desire to expend minimal cognitive effort on justifying candidate preferences.
How well does this motivated reasoning framework describe the way vot-
ers invoke persuasion and projection in practice? Chapter 4 investigates the
multi-issue nature of voters’ motivated reasoning strategies. Using panel sur-
vey data from the 1976, 1980, and 2008 U.S. presidential elections, I demon-
strate that most voters regard themselves and their preferred candidates as
being closer in policy space (relative to their non-preferred candidates) on not
just one but several issues over the course of the campaign. These multi-issue
strategies are both more common and more effective at reducing cognitive
dissonance than their single-issue counterparts. Additionally, I explore vari-
ation in the dynamics of perceived voter-candidate agreement across issues
to identify characteristics and circumstances that influence on which issues
voters invoke persuasion and projection.
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Whereas Chapter 4 deals with multi-issue motivated reasoning, Chapter 5
centers on multi-process motivated reasoning. Introducing a new method for
decomposing motivated reasoning strategies into persuasion and projection,
I find that a majority of voters balance persuasion and projection in pursuit
of perceived voter-candidate agreement, rather than exhibiting overreliance
on one process or the other. As with multi-issue strategies, multi-process
motivated reasoning is shown to be more effective at increasing the relative
proximity of preferred candidates within voters’ conceptualizations of policy
space. I also investigate the extent to which adjustments to issue impor-
tance ratings (an often overlooked motivated reasoning process) contribute
to voters’ cognitive dissonance reduction and whether instability in voters’
self- and candidate placements is attributable to campaign-induced learning
rather than biased information processing.
Having demonstrated multi-issue, multi-process motivated reasoning strate-
gies consistent with my theory, I turn to the consequences of these strategies
in Chapter 6. On the whole, these consequences yield a cautiously opti-
mistic outlook on citizen competence. Motivated reasoning does not beget
a complete distortion of public opinion, as the individual adjustments that
comprise persuasion and projection effects tend to be small. Voters are not
incapable of internalizing disagreements with the politicians they support,
and can comfortably accept some daylight between themselves and their pre-
ferred candidates provided that they believe them to be the most proximate
choice, all things considered. Additionally, voters’ capacity for motivated rea-
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soning is not infinite: as their cognitive dissonance increases, they become
increasingly likely to switch to another candidate rather than striving tire-
lessly to justify their initial choice. Encouragingly, the proportion of voters
who “get it wrong” by picking a candidate other than the most proximate one
in policy space is small and consists primarily of voters who view themselves
as roughly equidistant from the candidates.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the implications of this theory for polit-
ical psychology and voter decision-making. The portrait of motivated rea-
soning developed in this dissertation does not resemble the stylized behavior
of subjects in the single-issue, single-process theories designs that dominate
research on persuasion and projection. These artificially constrained studies
of the dynamics of perceived voter-candidate agreement have their merits,
but they must be contextualized in order to be interpretable as indications of
how voters reason about politics in complex campaign environments. Only
by giving voters access to all the tools at their disposal to rationalize their
candidate preferences with respect to issue proximity can we expect to ob-
serve how they actually cope with perceived voter-candidate disagreement.
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2
Issue Representation in Theory and Practice
Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by
considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a
thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.
—Alexander Hamilton
From a democratic theory standpoint, it is both natural and proper for
voters to report that they agree with the candidates they support on the
issues of the day. Whether this association between agreement and support
portends good or ill for democratic representation depends on what comes
first. If agreement precedes support, election- and reelection-minded politi-
cians are incentivized to be faithful stewards of their constituents, who reward
and punish them based on the positions they take. If support precedes agree-
ment – that is, if agreement is generated to justify candidate preferences ex
post facto – voters may be blinded to instances where candidates break rank
with them on the issues, reducing said candidates’ motivation to abide by
public opinion (Lenz 2012).
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Worrisomely for democratic theory, much of the agreement voters perceive
between themselves and their preferred candidates on the issues appears to
be a consequence of candidate support rather than a cause thereof. Over the
past half-century, political psychologists have zealously cataloged the charac-
teristics and circumstances that prompt voters to modify their issue positions
and candidate perceptions to justify their candidate preferences. These ef-
forts have contributed substantially to our understanding of how political
wishful thinking can override accuracy goals and render citizens less effective
sentinels of their representation in government. However, the theories and
research designs employed to study this topic share a common limitation:
they do not allow us to make or test predictions about how individual voters
grapple with dissonant candidate preferences in realistic campaign environ-
ments. Rather, they attempt to isolate single issues and single processes
in ways that oversimplify both the problems voters face and the solutions
available to them. Consequently, we do not know precisely how voters ad-
just their conceptualizations of policy space to rationalize their candidate
preferences, how effective this rationalization is at alleviating cognitive dis-
sonance, or whether potential interventions aimed at improving democratic
accountability might dissuade them from sweeping disagreements with their
preferred candidates under the rug.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. Beginning with issue voting
in its idealized form, I will summarize the scholarly literature on how voter
decision-making in practice falls short of the exactitude of rational choice the-
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ory – that is, how voters wind up disagreeing with their preferred candidates
in the first place. I will then explore the two principal means voters have for
rectifying said disagreement without changing their candidate preferences –
persuasion and projection – and the characteristics and circumstances which
promote these processes. Finally, I will explain why existing scholarship, due
to its reliance on single-issue, single-process theories and research designs,
does not enable us to generalize confidently about how voters rationalize
their candidate preferences, leaving crucial questions about citizen compe-
tence and democratic representation unanswered.
Issue Voting Idealized
Democracy is, among other things, a mechanism for translating public will
into government policy (Dahl 1956; Manza and Cook 2002; Pennock 1979).
One measure of the effectiveness of a democracy is the extent to which the
policies it enacts and enforces reflect the desires of its populace. This corre-
spondence between what people want and what government does is important
from not only a theoretical perspective but also a practical one, as policy di-
vergence from public opinion can yield distrust of and dissatisfaction with
political institutions (Alesina and Wacziarg 2000; Citrin 1974; Gamson 1968;
Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
For a democracy to produce policies that align with voters’ preferences,
voters must in some way take those preferences into account when partici-
pating in politics, primarily through the electoral process (Dahl 1956; 1989;
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Macdonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995). Politicians hoping to gain or
maintain positions of power, so the logic goes, will be discouraged from stray-
ing too far from public opinion if they expect to be held accountable for their
policy platforms at the ballot box (Bianco 1994; Mayhew 1974; McChesney
2007).
How do voters wield their ballots in a way that promotes accurate is-
sue representation? The dominant model of issue voting in political science
suggests that they minimize their loss of utility by backing the candidate or
party whose positions are closest to their own (Downs 1957).1 According to
this proximity voting model, the issue positions of voters and candidates or
parties can be represented geometrically as fixed points in “policy space.”
Voters achieve issue representation by privileging candidates whose locations
in policy space are nearest to their own, incentivizing candidates to stake out
popular positions in anticipation of such behavior.
Issue Voting in Practice
If choosing the candidate who best approximates one’s issue positions maxi-
mizes issue representation, why do voters frequently support candidates who
are not the most proximate options? Simply put, issue proximity is hard
1A competing theory suggests that voters prioritize the candidate or party which is on
their side of the issue and furthest away from the status quo (or some other neutral
point), on the grounds that said candidate or party is the most likely to produce the
policy change they desire (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). Some scholars have sought
to combine this “directional” theory with proximity ones (Merrill and Grofman 1999).
However, the Downsian model remains one of the most influential in the study of voter
decision-making (Dow and Munger 1990).
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to use in preference formation, other decision criteria are easy to use, and
non-issue criteria often point voters to candidates other than the ones with
whom they agree the most.
For all but the most cognitively invested voter, it is prohibitively difficult
to apply proximity voting logic to candidate selection with precision. Any
given election brings many issues to bear, most of which cannot be naturally
mapped out in a way that allows for unambiguous distance judgments in
policy space. Even diligent voters armed with crystallized opinions about
policy and comprehensive information about the candidates’ platforms might
still struggle to determine exactly how much farther away one candidate
is than another on the issues. A two-party system might make the slates
of candidates more predictable in terms of policy platforms (Levendusky
2010), but many voters lack the capacity for cogent ideological thinking that
would enable them to effectively take advantage of these simplified choice
sets (Converse 1964; Jacoby 1991; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Knight 1985;
Stimson 1975).
Beyond the intrinsic challenge of determining the most proximate candi-
date, voters often have few incentives for deliberate thinking about politics.
Psychologically, humans desire to spend as little cognitive effort as necessary
to reach conclusions (Allport 1954; Simon 1955; Taylor 1981). Naturally, this
tendency to economize cognition conflicts with the desire to reach correct
conclusions, leading to a trade-off between efficiency and accuracy (Hogarth
1980; Lau 2003). Because the choices individual voters make at the polls are
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usually much less influential on their wellbeing than choices made elsewhere,
most voters have few incentives to pay close attention when preparing to cast
their ballots (Kuklinski et al. 2001).
Even voters with the ability to parse complex policy space and the moti-
vation to “get it right” in their political decision-making might nevertheless
wind up forming candidate preferences using criteria other than Downsian
proximity. Some may be party loyalists, relying on their partisanship as
either a heuristic or an actionable social identity (Brader 2006; Campbell
et al. 1960; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; Popkin 1991). Others may differentiate
candidates based on perceived traits (e.g., likability, physical attractiveness)
or reputations (e.g., honesty, expertise, character) when choosing whom to
support (Mondak and Huckfeldt 2006; Popkin 1991; Riker 1982; Schumpeter
1942). Still others may rely on retrospective assessments of economic per-
formance to decide whether to support the incumbent candidate or party
(Fiorina 1981; Key 1966; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988), although these assess-
ments may reflect voters’ short memories (Achen and Bartels 2016; Bartels
2008).
These non-issue voting criteria are not necessarily less legitimate or nor-
matively desirable than issue voting, but they do have the potential to lead
voters to prefer candidates with less proximate issue positions. Whenever
the many decision criteria available to voters (issue proximity, partisanship,
candidate likability, economic evaluations, etc.) do not all favor the same
candidate, voters may find themselves cross-pressured by these competing
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considerations (Groenendyk 2013; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012).
When Election Day rolls around, these cross-pressured voters have the option
to vote with their heads, their hearts, their guts, or their wallets, but not all
of the above.
Given the difficulty of discerning the most proximate candidate in com-
plex campaign environments, the relative ease of other voting criteria, and
the fact that different decision rules often yield different outcomes, it should
not be surprising that many voters wind up supporting candidates who are
not their closest analogs in policy space for one reason or another. In the
end, something – likely whichever consideration or considerations voters hold
most dear (Abelson 1968) – must win out, and issue proximity does not al-
ways do so. But cross-pressures do not vanish automatically after initial
preference formation; they may continue to discomfort voters unless they
can be tolerated, acceded to, or eliminated through cognitive effort.
Voter-Candidate Disagreement and Motivated Reasoning
Although voters have opportunities to form preferences for candidates other
than the most policy-proximate ones, they also have many chances to realize
and “correct” these spatial errors.2 Election seasons are long and drawn out,
allowing campaigns and media to disseminate information that can clarify
2Choosing a less proximate candidate in policy space is a mistake only if one accept the
notion that issue proximity is the a priori criterion for candidate selection. By describing
such a choice as an error, I am classifying it as such within a proximity voting framework
and not making a normative judgment about what constitutes a correct or incorrect vote.
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voters’ opinions on the issues of the day and where the candidates stand on
them (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Lang
and Lang 1966; Trenaman and McQuail 1961). Interest in presidential cam-
paigns also increases as Election Day draws near (Bartels 2000), potentially
tuning progressively more voters into this information flow.
If voters are exposed to information that causes them to observe a mis-
match between conceptualizations of policy space and their candidate pref-
erences, they may experience cognitive dissonance – the mental discom-
fort that arises from holding contradictory beliefs or ideas simultaneously
(Abramowitz 1978; Festinger 1957; Greenwald et al. 2002; Heider 1958).3
Such a situation can put voters in a bind. On the one hand, civic norms
suggest that democratic citzens should be unbiased appraisers of politics
(Campbell et al. 1960; Dalton 2008; Schudson 1998) whose duty it is to hold
politicians accountable for the positions they take (Mutz 1998; Tetlock and
Kim 1987). On the other hand, democratic citizens are not supposed to be
wishy-washy and change their loyalties at the drop of a hat (Tetlock, Skitka,
and Boettger 1989), and switching allegiance to a more proximate candidate
upon encountering cognitive dissonance means overriding whatever decision
criteria factored into the initial selection process.
Voters who experience cognitive dissonance from supporting one candi-
3One can encounter cognitive dissonance even when supporting the “best match” from
a slate of candidates, provided that one’s issue positions diverge from one’s perceptions
of a preferred candidate’s positions. However, cognitive dissonance of this type may be
ameliorated by the assurance that one is supporting the “lesser of two evils” in terms of
policy disagreements (Groenendyk 2013).
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date and agreeing with another can reduce it by changing either their support
or their agreement. The former entails overruling their initial preferences and
adopting one justified by proximity voting. The latter involves updating their
perceptions of policy space to rationalize their initial preferences, essentially
reverse-engineering conceptualizations of policy space that would make their
choices consistent with proximity voting. As with a mistake made on a math
problem, one can redo the calculation to arrive at a different answer or “fudge
the numbers” so that they add up, subtract, multiply, or divide to the original
answer.
Of course, fudging the numbers on one’s math homework is unlikely to
satisfy students (and even less likely to satisfy teachers) as much as redoing
the problem to get the correct result. But voters who are personally invested
in their candidate preferences might well prefer rationalizing those prefer-
ences to deciding anew. We know from the work of cognitive psychologists
that humans pursue competing goals when they reason, be it about politics
or anything else. Accuracy goals (making correct decisions and judgments)
often conflict with directional goals (validating previous decisions and judg-
ments). We want to get things right, but we also want to believe that we
have been getting them right all along. When accuracy is prioritized over
consistency, the result is accuracy motivated reasoning, whereas consistency
trumping accuracy yields directional motivated reasoning (Kunda 1990).
Directional motivated reasoning (hereafter referred to as “motivated rea-
soning” unless otherwise specified) is replete in politics (Lavine, Johnston,
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and Steenbergen 2012; Taber, Lodge, and Glathar 2001). Political partici-
pation is often (some would say always) an emotionally-charged experience,
especially when it is tied to ingrained identities like partisanship (Campbell
et al. 1960; Groenendyk 2013; Lodge and Taber 2013). Paradoxically, the
most politically sophisticated voters, who might seem best equipped to fulfill
the norms of democratic citizenship, are often the most proficient at us-
ing motivated reasoning to reconcile discrepancies that might threaten their
deeply held beliefs (Bartels 2008; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Gaines
et al. 2007; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979). From a democratic theory per-
spective, this is problematic: if knowledge about and engagement in politics
makes voters better at ignoring disagreements with their candidates, polit-
ical “sophistication” might negatively impact democratic responsiveness by
preventing them from properly judging the actions of politicians (Fortunato
and Hibbing 2016).
Persuasion and Projection
In terms of motivated reasoning about issue positions, there are two main
processes by which voters attempt to reduce the relative distance they per-
ceive between themselves and their preferred candidates in policy space. The
first is persuasion, in which voters change their issue positions to be more
consistent with those they perceive their preferred candidate as holding.4
4Persuasion is very similar to the process known as cue-taking, in that both refer to
situations in which candidates’ perceived issue positions influence voters’ issue positions.
They differ conceptually in that cue-taking is generally considered to represent accuracy-
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Persuasion tends to be more common when voters have positive affect to-
ward a candidate (Page and Jones 1979; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987),
when the issues in question are highly salient (Dancey and Goren 2010), when
voters are loyal partisans and issues are couched in terms of party cues (Bul-
lock 2011; Cohen 2003; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Layman
and Carsey 2002; Page and Jones 1979), and when voters do not consider
the issues at hand to be personally important (Alvarez and Franklin 1994;
Carsey and Layman 2006; Markus and Converse 1979).
The second motivated reasoning process voters use to alleviate cognitive
dissonance from voter-candidate disagreement is projection. Unlike persua-
sion, which entails adjusting one’s own issue positions, projection consists
of updating one’s perceptions of where the candidates stand on the issues.
Projection can take the form of either assimilation -– pulling a preferred can-
didate closer — or contrast -– pushing a non-preferred candidate further away
(Merrill, Grofman, and Adams 2001; Sherif and Hovland 1961). Projection
is most likely when preferred candidates are likeable and/or non-preferred
candidates are unlikeable (Brady and Sniderman 1985; Kinder 1978; Markus
and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979), when candidates take ambiguous
policy positions that can be more freely interpreted by voters (Kenski and
Jamieson 2006; Patton and Smith 1980; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009),
when voters are inattentive or uninformed (Abramowitz 1978; Alvarez and
motivated reasoning (i.e., deferring to presumed experts on policy questions) whereas
persuasion is viewed as satisfying directional goals (Carmines and Kuklinski 1990; Lupia
1994).
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Franklin 1994), and when voters attach high personal importance to the is-
sues in question and are unwilling to budge on their own positions (Granberg
and Brent 1974).5
For the most part, the scholarly literature on proximity voting does not
classify persuasion and projection as motivated reasoning processes – at least
not explicitly. Nevertheless, both processes clearly fit the bill: they are cog-
nitively effortful attempts to justify past decisions (candidate preferences)
by eliminating or reducing a source of cognitive dissonance (perceived voter-
candidate disagreement). As I will contend in Chapter 3, treating persuasion
and projection as types of motivated reasoning provides the necessary frame-
work for understanding how voters attempt to rationalize their candidate
preferences in complex campaign environments.
Why Single-Issue, Single-Process Studies Fall Short
As the litany of citations above suggests, persuasion and projection have
occupied the attention of political scientists for many years and many pages.
Yet our understanding of how voters rationalize their candidate preferences
with respect to issue proximity remains hampered by the constrained nature
of these theories and research designs. Too often, research on persuasion
and projection is circumscribed to a single issue and focused on only one of
the two processes, rendering it unsuitable for illuminating voters’ motivated
5Although most of the examinations of persuasion and projection cited here concern the
American political system, these processes are not unique to the United States, though
they vary with electoral systems (Drummond 2010).
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reasoning habits as they manifest themselves in real campaigns.
To illustrate the inadequacy of single-issue, single-process studies for gen-
eralizing about voters, consider an archetypal example from the political psy-
chology literature. Abramowitz (1978) conducted a two-wave panel study of
voters in Williamsburg-James City County, Virginia, during the 1976 presi-
dential election, comparing respondents’ positions and perceptions of Jimmy
Carter and Gerald Ford’s positions on the issue of unemployment assistance
before and after the first presidential debate. Abramowitz found that respon-
dents who watched the debate were more likely to correctly identify Carter
as supportive of a government works program to help the jobless and Ford as
opposed to the same. However, respondents who heard their preferred can-
didate espouse a position with which they disagreed tended to adopt their
preferred candidate’s position, rather than defect to the other candidate.
Abramowitz (correctly) interpreted this result as evidence of persuasion.
But what does this tell us about how voters actually parse politics during
presidential campaigns? Abramowitz describes defection for those voters who
initially disagreed with their preferred candidates as “rational voting,” but
how do we know that switching from Carter to Ford or vice versa is rational?
Perhaps Ford’s supporters agreed with him more than Carter on issues such
as foreign policy, crime, and government spending, and were not about to let a
little difference on unemployment policy drive them away. Furthermore, what
if Carter supporters who disagreed with his position construed his debate
answers as representing a more moderate position, closer to their own – that
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is to say, what if they projected? The binary nature of the survey questions
allowed voters to exhibit persuasion or projection, but not both.
The intent of this exercise is not to harp on Abramowitz’s research de-
sign in particular but rather to highlight an endemic weakness of the research
designs used to study persuasion and projection: they do not resemble vot-
ers’ natural habitat. Both observational (e.g., Bailey, Sigelman, and Wilcox
2003; Kenski and Jamieson 2006) and experimental studies (e.g., Linder 2015;
Tomz and Van Houweling 2009) construct environments in which voters are
unable to engage in persuasion and projection simultaneously, or are at least
unable to demonstrate through survey responses that they have done so.
Moreover, these studies attempt to isolate persuasion and projection effects
on single issues (or on multiple issues considered separately), when the very
proximity voting theories on which expectations about persuasion and projec-
tion are founded hinge on proximity across all relevant issues in a campaign.
A separate class of studies aims not to document individual persuasion
and projection effects but rather to assess the overall impact of persuasion
and projection at the aggregate level (Markus and Converse 1979; McDonald,
Çarkoğlu, and Moral 2015; Page and Jones 1979; Visser 1994). These exam-
inations have the benefit of considering persuasion and projection together,
often across multiple issues. However, it is impossible to infer individual mo-
tivated reasoning strategies from these aggregate estimates of persuasion and
projection. Is the electorate made up of pure persuadees and pure projectors,
or of voters who dabble in both processes? Is the overall persuasion effect
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driven by a few voters being persuaded substantially or many voters being
persuaded slightly? A thousand-foot view of motivated reasoning about issue
positions tells us little about how any given voter rationalizes her candidate
preference.
The Importance of Understanding Individual Motivated Reasoning
Strategies
Ironically, for all the efforts expended on understanding the characteristics
and circumstances that encourage or discourage persuasion and projection,
political science remains unable to answer a simple question: if a given voter
perceives her preferred candidate as not being the most proximate in policy
space, how will she seek to reconcile that discrepancy? Single-issue, single-
process theories and research designs offer clues to the answer but not the
answer itself. Trying to infer actual voter behavior based on these artificially
constrained scenarios is like trying to predict what plays a football team will
call in a game based on observing practice sessions where they are only al-
lowed to run the ball or only allowed to pass the ball. We know the motivated
reasoner’s playbook, but not the motivated reasoner’s game plan.
Why does it matter how individual voters motivatedly reason about issue
positions? First, the extent to which persuasion and projection interfere
with democratic representation and accountability depends heavily on what
sort of motivated reasoning strategies voters are invoking to rationalize their
candidate preferences. An electorate whose issue positions and candidate
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perceptions are only slightly perturbed by persuasion and projection is vastly
different from one whose conceptualizations of policy space are massively
distorted in the service of reducing cognitive dissonance. Second, apart from
the question of electoral choice, knowing what sort of motivated reasoning is
taking place is necessary for interpreting public opinion in the proper context
– that is, for understanding how much of voters’ attitudes are the product
of wishful thinking rather than exogenous to their candidate preferences.
Third, those interested in promoting citizen competence through some form
of intervention aimed at reducing motivated reasoning – be they institutional
reforms, civic education initiatives, or incentives for candidates to take less
ambiguous stances – cannot hope to succeed without grasping the nature of
the problem they wish to tackle. What works at dissuading one motivated
reasoning strategy may be feckless at combating others.
An accurate sense of how voters cope with discord between their concep-
tualizations of policy space and their candidate preferences requires a theory
of motivated reasoning that accounts for voters’ ability to be persuaded and
to project on multiple issues. In the next chapter, I propose such a theory.
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3
A Theory of Motivated Reasoning about Issue
Positions
The human understanding when it has once adopted an
opinion...draws all things else to support and agree with it. And
though there be a great number and weight of instances to be
found on the other side, yet these it either neglects or despises,
or else by some distinction sets aside or rejects....
—Francis Bacon
The nature of democratic politics gives rise to situations in which voters
disagree with the candidates they support on matters of policy. Some of these
voters, rather than switch their allegiances to more proximate candidates
(if such candidates exist), adjust their conceptualizations of policy space to
rationalize their candidate preferences. These adjustments have the potential
to alleviate the cognitive dissonance that comes from disagreeing with a liked
candidate, but they may also jeopardize democratic accountability, if voters
distort their issue positions and candidate perceptions so much that they lose
their ability to hold politicians accountable for their stances.
How do voters wield persuasion and projection to reduce the relative pol-
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icy distance between themselves and their preferred candidates? How effec-
tive are these processes at reducing cognitive dissonance from voter-candidate
disagreement? How much do they subvert voters’ capacity for discriminat-
ing between politicians’ platforms? Despite considerable efforts on the part
of political scientists to document the characteristics and circumstances that
lead voters to motivatedly reason about issue positions, answers to these cru-
cial questions have not been forthcoming. Although much has been written
on persuasion and projection, theories and research designs have been lim-
ited to either single-issue, single-process studies or aggregate examinations
of overall tendencies of the electorate – neither of which allow for generaliz-
ing about motivated reasoning strategies at the individual level in realistic
campaign scenarios.
In this chapter, I present a theory of motivated reasoning about issue
positions in complex campaign environments. I part ways with the conven-
tions of the literature in attempting to account for rationalization strategies
that are uniquely applicable to multi-issue policy space where voters have
both persuasion and projection at their disposal. Balancing the dual goals of
alleviating cognitive dissonance and minimizing cognitive effort, voters are
drawn to motivated reasoning strategies that are both multi-issue and multi-
process. By combining persuasion and projection across several issues, voters
can achieve substantial reductions in perceived voter-candidate disagreement
through a combination of small, cognitively cheap adjustments to their issue
positions and candidate preferences. Only when voters’ conceptualizations
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of policy space are extremely out of sync with their candidate preferences
are these multi-issue, multi-process strategies less cognitively efficient than
switching candidate preferences.
Pressure to Rationalize: Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
My theory concerns voters who already have a set of issue positions, a set
of perceptions about the candidates’ issue positions, and a preference for
one of the candidates. I am agnostic about the sources of these positions,
perceptions, and preferences. Although much of the work on persuasion and
projection is grounded in the logic of proximity voting, for the purposes of my
theory these candidate preferences need not have resulted from a Downsian,
proximity-driven process. Indeed, motivated reasoning about issue positions
is most likely to come into play in situations where candidate preferences are
not based on voters’ perceptions about the candidates’ relative proximity in
policy space, as these preferences are more likely to result in voter-candidate
disagreement that produces cognitive dissonance.
Taking these parameters as given, I can estimate a voter’s impetus for
engaging in motivated reasoning about issue positions. That impetus is the
degree to which a voter’s candidate preference does not logically follow (from
a proximity voting perspective) from her issue positions and candidate per-
ceptions. Specifically, it is the voter’s perceived distance between herself and
her preferred candidate, relative to the distance she perceives between her-
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self and the closest non-preferred candidate.1 I term this relative distance
perceived spatial inconsistency.2
When perceived spatial inconsistency is minimal, the proximity of the
voter’s preferred candidate in policy space relative to the proximity of the
next closest candidate is maximized: the voter perceives her preferred can-
didate to be as close to her as possible and the next closest candidate as
far away as possible on the issues. In terms of proximity voting, her candi-
date preference could not possibly make more sense. When perceived spatial
inconsistency is maximal, this relative proximity is minimized: the voter per-
ceives her preferred candidate to be as far away from her as possible and a
non-preferred candidate as close to her as possible on the issues. From a
Downsian perspective, her candidate preference could not possibly make less
sense. Midway between these extremes is the point of indifference, where
the voter perceives herself as equidistant from both her preferred candidate
and her closest non-preferred candidate. Per proximity voting, her candi-
date preference makes sense, but no more or less so than a preference for the
closest non-preferred candidate (see Figure 3.1).
1Although my theory is constructed and explicated with the American two-party system
in mind, its basic logic applies to multiparty contexts as well.
2Note that the word perceived here refers to the fact that the inconsistency is based on the
voter’s perceptions of the candidates’ issue positions, which are not necessarily the same as
the candidates’ actual issue positions. It does not refer to whether the voter is cognizant
of the inconsistency. Thus, it is possible for voters to possess what I call perceived spatial
inconsistency – based on the mismatch between their candidate preferences and their
conceptualizations of policy space – without being aware of the fact (though, in such
cases, they are unlikely to experience cognitive dissonance from it). In my analyses, I
rely on self-reported perceptions, and thus restrict attention to those who have explicitly










Figure 3.1: Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
The initials of “perceived spatial inconsistency” are PSI, bearing a fit-
ting resemblance to the abbreviation for pounds per square inch, a unit for
measuring pressure or stress. Perceived spatial inconsistency, if recognized
by voters, can lead to cognitive dissonance that produces stress and pres-
sures them to adjust either their candidate preferences or their conceptu-
alizations of policy space. This cognitive dissonance may stem from basic
social-psychological compulsions to agree with those we like and like those
with whom we agree (Fiske and Taylor 2008), democratic-citizenship norms
linking issue agreement to political support (Kam 2007), or both. Regardless
of its origin, cognitive dissonance increases as perceived spatial inconsistency
grows and candidate preferences become less defensible in terms of proximity
voting. Greater PSI means greater pressure to rationalize.
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Pressure Valves: Tactics for Reducing Perceived Spatial
Inconsistency
Voters who become aware of perceived spatial inconsistency may desire to
alleviate the cognitive dissonance it creates. They can achieve this goal
through one, some, or all of the following tactics:
 Persuasion (adopting issue positions closer to those one perceives one’s
preferred candidate to hold)
 Assimilation (perceiving one’s preferred candidate’s issue positions as
being closer to one’s own positions)
 Contrast (perceiving the closest non-preferred candidate’s issue posi-
tions as being further away from one’s own positions)3
 Switching (updating one’s candidate preference to a more proximate
candidate)
Within the standard spatial voting framework, these are the only tac-
tics by which a voter can reduce spatial inconsistency.4 Switching, because
3Assimilation and contrast are the two faces of projection (Sherif and Hovland 1961).
4Although rarely considered alongside persuasion and projection in the political psychol-
ogy literature, reprioritization – the act of downweighting the importance of issues on
which voter-candidate disagreement exists relative to issues on which it does not – could
theoretically be used to reduce perceived spatial inconsistency (Groenendyk 2013). I
consider this possibility in Chapter 5. Other tactics, such as ignoring issues altogether
or outweighing them with non-issue criteria, may reduce cognitive dissonance but do not
affect perceived spatial inconsistency as defined here, and are therefore beyond the scope
of this dissertation.
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it entails “correcting” the preference that is supposed to follow from one’s
positions and perceptions, is a form of accuracy motivated reasoning. The
other three tactics are forms of directional motivated reasoning, because they
rationalize the preference instead of modifying it (Kunda 1990).5 Figure 3.2
provides a visual representation of how these tactics might operate in a two-
dimensional policy space.
How much perceived spatial inconsistency can voters bear without feel-
ing compelled to reduce it? How much must they reduce before they are
satisfied? In a strict proximity voting sense, any scenario where a voter per-
ceives her preferred candidate as the most proximate (or one of several most
proximate candidates) would be tolerable, and any other situation would be
intolerable. From this perspective, anywhere at or left of the midpoint of
the perceived spatial inconsistency scale in Figure 3.1 should not produce
cognitive dissonance. However, this threshold might not manifest itself so
clearly in practice for several reasons. First, voters may have heterogeneous
levels of tolerance for cognitive dissonance in general or for perceived spa-
tial inconsistency in particular (Krause 1972; Ray 1999). Second, voters are
unlikely to have both the ability and the motivation to calculate the rela-
tive proximity of their preferred candidates with perfect accuracy (Kuklinski
et al. 2001; Simon 1955), and may therefore continue to reduce perceived
spatial inconsistency past the point of indifference until their candidate pref-
5These tactics map neatly onto Festinger’s (1957) methods of dissonance reduction.
Switching represents changing a behavior or cognition. Persuasion, assimilation, and

































Figure 3.2: Tactics for Reducing Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
(V =voter, P =preferred candidate, N =non-preferred candidate)
erences are clearly justifiable. Third, even if voters could calculate candidate
proximity with mathematical precision, they might nevertheless attempt to
reduce perceived spatial inconsistency beyond the point of indifference as
insurance against future shocks that might perturb their conceptualizations
of policy space in dissonance-inducing ways. For any or all of these reasons,
voters may “run up the score” when motivatedly reasoning about issue posi-
tions, going beyond what is technically necessary to rationalize a candidate
preference with respect to proximity voting.
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The Cognitive Cost of Motivated Reasoning
These motivated reasoning adjustments are not costless. If they were, there
would be nothing stopping voters from completely recalibrating their con-
ceptualizations of policy space to eliminate perceived spatial inconsistency
altogether, and voters would never consciously hold candidate preferences
that conflicted with their positions and priorities. Rather, motivated rea-
soning requires cognitive effort to change one’s preconceptions, selectively
interpreting information or thinking of counterarguments to prior judgments
(Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2015). The attitudinal inertia voters must over-
come to modify their positions and perceptions creates a tradeoff between
minimizing cognitive dissonance and minimizing cognitive effort.
Predicting how voters balance these two goals requires some scheme for
assigning relative “costs” to specific motivated reasoning adjustments. This
is a formidable task. As discussed in Chapter 2, a plethora of voter character-
istics and election circumstances contribute to the relative ease or difficulty
of certain motivated reasoning processes on certain issues. Moreover, many
of these factors interact with each other and impact some voters and cir-
cumstances more than others. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to make
claims about the relationship between motivated reasoning and cognitive ef-
fort that will apply equally to all voters in all circumstances.
In spite of these differences in characteristics and circumstances, one fact
about the relationship between motivated reasoning adjustments and cogni-
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tive effort should be generalizable across cases: all else equal, the larger an
adjustment is, the more cognitive effort it will require. For example, a voter
who is extremely opposed to government spending would have to expend
less cognitive effort to change her position to moderate opposition than to
change her position to moderate support – which, in turn, would require less
cognitive effort than changing her position to extreme support. The further
she travels in policy space from her initial position, the harder she will have
to work to counter-argue her preconceptions and justify the change. Ce-
teris paribus, small adjustments (whether they be persuasion, assimilation,
or contrast) should demand less brainpower than large adjustments of the
same type.
Beyond this assertion about small steps versus giant leaps, attributing
cognitive costs becomes much thornier. Previous studies of motivated rea-
soning about issue positions have rarely considered more than one issue or
process at a time, and have never developed a theoretical framework for un-
derstanding how voters employ more than one process in multi-issue policy
space. The challenge in developing such a framework is that every voter has
a unique cognitive cost structure for motivated reasoning, depending on the
issues and processes in question. As recounted in Chapter 2, the literature on
persuasion and projection demonstrates that some voters are more persuad-
able than others and that some have a greater capacity for projection than
others. Likewise, cognitive costs for motivated reasoning may vary depend-
ing on the issues in question. Although the cognitive cost of any motivated
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reasoning adjustment should in principle increase with the size of the ad-
justment for any particular motivated reasoning process on any particular
issue, making generalizable comparisons across issues and processes is not so
simple.6
Rather than attempt to grapple with the myriad of heterogeneous in-
fluences on the cognitive costs of motivated reasoning, I elect to treat all
motivated reasoning adjustments of the same size as equally cognitively de-
manding, regardless of the issue or process involved. This assumption is
convenient for the purpose of developing a theory about voters’ motivated
reasoning strategies, but it is not part of that theory. As such, the extent to
which my theory is supported by the empirical work in the next few chapters
should not be taken as evidence that all issues and processes are cognitively
equal in the motivated reasoner’s mind. However, it will suggest that what-
ever heterogeneity exists in the cognitive costs voters face when motivatedly
reasoning about issue positions is not so great as to make my theory useless
for understanding the rationalization of candidate preferences.
Spreading Motivated Reasoning Across Issues
Past research on motivated reasoning about issue positions has established
that voters, when faced with self- and candidate placements in one-dimensional
6Even voters’ perceptions of issue importance, which have been shown to relate to per-
suasion and projection (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Granberg and Brent 1974; Markus
and Converse 1979), present difficulties in that issue importance ratings may themselves
be subject to motivated reasoning (Groenendyk 2013). I examine this phenomenon in
Chapter 5.
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policy space, are driven to increase the relative proximity of themselves to
their chosen candidates. What happens when more than one issue is at stake
– when policy space is not collapsed to a single dimension? Do voters apply
the same motivated reasoning strategies regardless of the complexity of the
campaign environment in which they are operating, or does the presence of
additional issues change their approach?
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 3.3. A hypothetical voter V in
two-dimensional policy space finds herself too far from her preferred candi-
date P and too close to her non-preferred candidate N for comfort. V could
alleviate the cognitive dissonance arising from this situation by moving her
position 2 units to the right to position x, 2 intervals up to position z, or
1 interval to the right and 1 interval up to position y.7 Of these three new
positions, which is V most likely to take up?
Each of these three new positions is closer to P than it is to N , meaning
that V ’s preference for P over N would be spatially consistent if she allowed
herself to be persuaded to any one of them. However, y requires V to move
herself a distance of only
√
2 intervals in policy space, whereas x and z are
located 2 intervals away from her starting point. If V seeks to minimize the
distance she moves herself and the cognitive effort expended to accomplish
said movement, y serves her purposes best.8 Indeed, for almost every config-
7Of course, these are not the only possible relocations V could undertake, but bounded
rationality (Simon 1955) and exogenous factors (see Chapter 2) might combine to limit
V ’s options to a small set of adjustments which includes these three.
8Technically, the most efficient way for V to “spend”
√
2 intervals of movement would be
to move to a point on the line NP that is
√















Figure 3.3: One-Dimensional versus Two-Dimensional Persuasion
uration of voter and candidates in multidimensional policy space, the most
efficient motivated reasoning strategies in terms of cognitive costs involve
adjustments in more than one dimension – that is, on more than one issue.
The relative cognitive efficiency of diffusing one’s motivated reasoning efforts
across several issues underlies what I call the multi-issue hypothesis:
Multi-issue hypothesis: Voters will spread motivated reasoning ef-
forts across multiple issues rather than concentrating them on a
practice, voters lack the precision to be able to make such an exact adjustment. Moreover,
even if they possessed such exactitude in their conceptualizations of policy space, standard
survey measures would still be too blunt to detect this nuance.
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single issue.
Within the scholarly literature on motivated reasoning about issue posi-
tions, this is a novel expectation. If one were to apply a traditional single-
issue research design based on the vertical issue dimension of Figure 3.3, V ’s
movement to y would be interpreted as resulting in indifference between P
and N , because the candidates would be equidistant from y vertically speak-
ing. Perceived spatial inconsistency, however is about relative proximity not
on any particular issue but across all issues. From a multi-issue perspective,
V ’s movement to y justifies her preference for P over N by making P the
most proximate candidate in her mind, not merely one of two equally proxi-
mate candidates. When we approaches questions about motivated reasoning
with a more realistic view of the campaign environment – where more than
one issue may be in play – new, more cognitively efficient rationalization
strategies become visible.
Spreading Motivated Reasoning Across Processes
We know from existing scholarship that, given the opportunity to be per-
suaded, voters will be persuaded under certain circumstances. Likewise, we
know that, given the opportunity to project (either by assimilating or con-
trasting), voters will project under certain circumstances. Do these same
tendencies manifest themselves when both persuasion and protection oppor-
tunities are available to voters simultaneously, or do voters update their mo-
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tivated reasoning strategies to reflect the fact that they have multiple tactics
at their disposal for reducing perceived spatial inconsistency?
Figure 3.4 displays another configuration of voter V , preferred candidate
P , and non-preferred candidate N . As before, V perceives herself to be closer
to N than to P , an inconsistency which creates cognitive dissonance. V could
resolve this inconsistency by moving herself 2 intervals left to position y, by
moving P 2 intervals right to position y, or by moving herself 1 interval left to
position z and P 1 interval right to position x. Each of these three strategies
would require a total movement of 2 intervals in the horizontal dimension
and render P the most proximate candidate in V ’s conceptualization of policy
space, justifying her preference according to the logic of spatial voting. Which
strategy would V prefer?
Of these three options, moving V to z and P to x has the advantage
of dragging neither V nor P particularly far from their original positions
in policy space. Recall my proposition that smaller motivated reasoning
adjustments require less cognitive effort than large ones. It may be the case
that this relationship between adjustment size and cognitive cost is linear,
in which case all three options would be equally cognitively demanding. A
more plausible alternative is that the relationship is quadratic or exponential,
such that two small adjustments would require less cognitive effort than a
large adjustment equivalent to the sum of the two small ones.9 If one two-
9To starkly illustrate this point, consider a voter in six-dimensional policy space who can
either move herself one interval on six seven-point issue scales or six intervals on one
seven-point issue scale. The former would require little in the way of counter-arguing her
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Figure 3.4: Persuasion versus Assimilation versus Both
interval move requires more cognitive effort than two one-interval moves,
meeting one’s preferred candidate halfway in policy space may be a more
efficient strategy than relying on persuasion or assimilation by itself, and
voters should spread their motivated reasoning efforts across processes just
as they should across issues. This constitutes my multi-process hypothesis:
original issue positions. The latter, by contrast, represents a major shift that forces her
to the other side of the issue in question, which would be harder to square with either
belief perseverance or democratic citizenship norms.
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Multi-process hypothesis: Voters will spread motivated efforts across
multiple processes rather than concentrating them on a single pro-
cess.
As with the multi-issue hypothesis, this expectation is not part of the con-
ventional wisdom on motivated reasoning about issue positions. The stan-
dard approach to studying persuasion and projection is to focus on one of
the two, often by precluding the other with a research design that limits
subjects’ motivated reasoning options. Applying such a design to the sce-
nario displayed in Figure 3.4 would regard either moving V to y or moving
P to y (depending on whether the focus was persuasion or projection) as a
strategy for rationalizing V ’s preference for P over N . However, it would
fail to capture moving V to z and P to x as a multi-process strategy with
the same rationalizing effect, due to its singular focus. Allowing voters to
engage in more than one motivated reasoning process at once reveals addi-
tional means by which they can reduce perceived spatial inconsistency and
alleviate cognitive dissonance.
To Switch or Not To Switch?
Of the aforementioned tactics for reducing perceived spatial inconsistency,
switching to a more proximate candidate is the odd one out in that it rep-
resents accuracy motivated reasoning rather than directional motivated rea-
soning. Whereas persuasion, assimilation, and contrast are all means of
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rationalizing a candidate preference with respect to issue proximity, switch-
ing entails abandoning a discordant preference for an alternative that follows
more logically from one’s conceptualization of policy space.
Although switching has the potential to considerably alleviate cognitive
dissonance, it also requires voters to overrule whatever decision criteria pro-
duced their initial candidate preferences. Suppressing these criteria – be they
party identification, candidate likeability, or something else – may be pro-
hibitively difficult if they represent deeply-held predispositions, such as party
identification (Stokes 1966). In most cases, as much or more perceived spatial
inconsistency can be reduced by small, cognitively cheap motivated reason-
ing adjustments. Unsurprisingly, voters in the United States tend to stick
with their preferred candidates throughout the presidential campaign season
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Erikson and Wlezien 2012). Thus,
although I suspect switching to be more likely as perceived spatial inconsis-
tency increases, I also expect it to be a relatively rare occurrence, invoked
only when the discrepancies voters face are too cumbersome to motivatedly
reason away (Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Generally speak-
ing, motivated reasoning represents a more amenable remedy for cognitive
dissonance.
How large of an effect switching has on perceived spatial inconsistency de-
pends on the relative proximity of one’s preferred candidate in policy space.
If the midpoint of perceived spatial inconsistency scale in Figure 3.1 is 0,
switching between the two most proximate candidates flips the sign of per-
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ceived spatial inconsistency. Thus, the higher perceived spatial inconsistency
is initially, the greater the benefits from switching will be (see Figure 3.5).10
This relationship undergirds what I call the switching hypothesis:
Switching hypothesis: As perceived spatial inconsistency increases,
the likelihood of a voter switching her candidate preference in-
creases.
The Empowered Motivated Reasoner
When faced with perceived spatial inconsistency between their conceptual-
izations of policy space and their candidate preferences, voters have many
options for responding to the pressure. Most of these options – specifically,
those that involve more than one motivated reasoning process on more than
one issue – have escaped previous attempts to study how voters rationalize
their candidate preferences. Single-process, single-issue studies shed some
light on the mechanisms behind motivated reasoning, but we cannot con-
fidently generalize from results of these studies to voters’ behavior in their
natural habitat: complex campaign environments where all motivated rea-
soning processes are available.
If, instead of isolating processes and issues, we consider all of the ways in
which voters might reduce perceived spatial inconsistency, we can make more
10If one or more of the candidates involved in the switch is not one of the two most
proximate (which may occur in multi-candidate or multiparty settings), the effect of
switching on one’s perceived spatial inconsistency may not necessarily be a sign flip.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of Switching between the Two Most Proximate
Candidates on Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
realistic predictions about the motivated reasoning strategies they would em-
ploy. First, motivated reasoning across multiple issues will generally be more
prevalent than motivated reasoning on single issues. Second, motivated rea-
soning strategies that combine persuasion, assimilation, and contrast will
generally be more prevalent than motivated reasoning consisting of only one
of these processes. Third, switching candidate preferences will generally oc-
cur only when perceived spatial inconsistency is so high that rationalizing
preferences through motivated reasoning is prohibitively costly in terms of
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Is this just math that you do as a Republican to make yourself
feel better, or is this real?
—Megyn Kelly
Presidential campaigns involve many issues. Candidates stake out po-
sitions on them, news media disseminate those positions, and voters make
decisions about which candidates to support in an environment that pro-
claims explicitly and implicitly that “issues matter.” This issue emphasis
can sometimes cause voters to form candidate preferences based on issue
proximity (accuracy motivated reasoning) or to reverse-engineer sets of is-
sue positions and candidate preferences that justify their non-issue-driven
preferences (directional motivated reasoning).
The extents to which accuracy and directional goals influence voter psy-
chology bear heavily on citizen competence and democratic representation.
Unfortunately, past scholarship on persuasion and projection, reliant as it
is on single-issue theories and research designs, offers little in the way of
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predictions about how motivated reasoners navigate complex campaign en-
vironments when multiple issues are in play. This oversight is especially
problematic if, as I theorized in Chapter 3, multi-issue motivated reason-
ing strategies offer voters cognitively efficient ways to reduce the cognitive
dissonance that stems from perceived voter-candidate disagreement.
In this chapter, I test my first hypothesis – voters will spread motivated
reasoning efforts across multiple issues rather than concentrating them on a
single issue – using panel surveys from three U.S. presidential elections. I
begin by measuring the change in perceived spatial inconsistency between
the beginning and end of the general election campaign season, establish-
ing that voters do indeed reduce the relative distance they perceive between
themselves and their preferred candidates as the campaign wears on. I then
demonstrate that a majority of voters exhibit motivated reasoning strategies
that are balanced across the issues, reducing perceived voter-candidate dis-
agreement on not just one but several issues as Election Day draws nearer.
Finally, I examine the relationship between “issue balance” and reduction in
perceived spatial inconsistency, showing that motivated reasoners are more
effective at mitigating voter-candidate disagreement the more “balanced”
their applications of persuasion and projection are.
Examining Motivated Reasoning Using Panel Studies
The grist for this investigation into multi-issue motivated reasoning is a trio
of panel studies conducted during U.S. presidential election campaigns: the
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1976 Presidential Campaign Impact on Voters study (Patterson 1982), the
1980 American National Election Studies panel, and the 2008-2009 Amer-
ican National Election Studies panel.1 Panel studies are especially suited
to examinations of attitude change because they interview the same respon-
dents more than once. This feature allows analysts to compare individual
respondents at different points in time, which means that individual changes
can be explicitly demonstrated rather than inferred from trends in staggered
cross-sectional surveys (Markus and Converse 1979).
These three panel studies all satisfy a narrow set of criteria necessary
for capturing the complexity of motivated reasoning at the individual level.
In each study, respondents were invited to place themselves and the major
party presidential candidates on the same seven-point issue scales at more
than one point in time.2 The precise points in time when these self- and
candidate placements occurred varies, but each study included at least one
wave fielded before the Democratic and Republican national conventions had
nominated the major party candidates and one wave fielded in October or
early November, just before Election Day.3 This repetition allows me to
1The 1976 PCIV sampled residents of Erie, Pennsylvania, and Los Angeles, California.
Both the 1980 and 2008-2009 ANES panels used nationally representative samples.
2The 1976 PCIV featured nine issues: abortion, school busing, crime, defense spending,
foreign policy, wage controls, government-guaranteed jobs, taxes, and welfare. The 1980
ANES featured four: defense spending, inflation, Russia, and government spending. The
2008-2009 ANES featured eight: a “path to citizenship” for illegal immigrants, detention
of terror suspects, healthcare, same-sex marriage, prescription drugs, taxes, work visas,
and warrantless wiretaps. Question wordings for these scale placements can be found in
Appendix A.
3The 2008-2009 ANES did not ask voters to place themselves alongside the candidates on
seven-point issue scales in its summer wave, so I used their January 2008 self-placements
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compare how voters viewed themselves and the candidates in policy space at
the beginning and the end of the general election campaign.4
It is worth noting that motivated reasoning about issue positions is not
a phenomenon unique to the summer and fall of presidential election years.
Citizens of democracies may encounter cognitive dissonance whenever polit-
ical actors they like take actions they do not like, or political actors they do
not like take actions they do like (Cohen 2003; Lavine, Johnston, and Steen-
bergen 2012). Some potential voters may enter the general election campaign
having already completed all of the motivated reasoning they will do for that
cycle, while others may not get around to persuasion and projection until
moments before they cast their ballots (or even later). However, the run-
up to a major election, when choices loom and voters prepare to decide, is
when the pressure to rationalize one’s candidate preferences is usually great-
est. The internecine conflicts of the primary season have subsided, political
news coverage is ramping up, and voters are confronted with the slate of
candidates with which they are stuck. Thus, although I cannot claim to cap-
ture all motivated reasoning about issue positions with these panel studies,
I suspect that a great deal of the justification processes voters undergo when
faced with perceived spatial inconsistency occurs within this conventions-to-
election period.
instead.
4All of the panel data analyzed in this and the following two chapters are drawn from
pre-election waves.
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Measuring Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
As delineated in Chapter 3, perceived spatial inconsistency is defined as
the distance a voter perceives between herself and her preferred candidate in
policy space, minus the distance she perceives between herself and her closest
non-preferred candidate. A perceived spatial inconsistency value less than (or
equal to) zero indicate that a voter prefers the most proximate candidate (or
one of several most proximate candidates). Cognitive dissonance increases
with perceived spatial inconsistency, as does the pressure to rationalize one’s
increasingly discordant candidate preference.
In line with existing research on spatial voting (e.g., Enelow and Hinich
1984), I calculate perceived spatial inconsistency as a difference of Euclidean
distances. Specifically, I subtract the distance a voter perceives between her-
self and her closest non-preferred candidate from the distance she perceives
between herself and her preferred candidate.5 For the purpose of distance
calculation, each issue is treated as a unique dimension in policy space. In
cases where voters answer “don’t know” or refuse to place themselves or one
5It is worth emphasizing that here, and throughout this dissertation, candidates’ locations
in policy space are always measured subjectively (using voters’ candidate placements),
not objectively (based on exogenous definitions of where the candidates stand on the is-
sues). The reason for using subjective placement is that cognitive dissonance, the driving
force behind motivated reasoning, stems not from objective facts about the world but
rather from mental representations of these facts, which may be but are not necessarily
based on objective reality (Blais et al. 2001; Kedar 2009; Westholm 1997). Although
accurate candidate perceptions are important for democratic accountability, this infor-
mation problem is distinct from the decision problem of proximity voting: one can have
low perceived spatial inconsistency and low cognitive dissonance even while maintaining
false premises about the candidates.
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of the candidates on a particular issue scale, I drop that issue dimension from
the calculation rather than imputing a scale placement.6




(Vi − Pi)2 −
√∑
(Vi −Ni)2 (4.1)
where Vi, Pi, and Ni represent the voter’s position, perception of her preferred
candidate’s position, and perception of her closest non-preferred candidate’s
position on issue i, respectively. The resulting measure of perceived spatial
inconsistency is rescaled to range between −1 and 1 such that higher numbers
indicate greater perceived spatial inconsistency and 0 represents perceived
equidistance between one’s preferred and closest non-preferred candidate in
policy space.
The Dynamics of Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
Before analyzing how voters shrink the relative gaps they perceive between
themselves and their preferred candidates over the course of a general election
campaign, it is important to establish whether those relative gaps actually
shrink. Figure 4.1 displays histograms of perceived spatial inconsistency at
6This decision to drop issues for which voters’ self- or candidate placements are missing
is based on the assumption that voters’ refusal to place themselves or the candidates on
a particular issue scale is uncorrelated with their perceived spatial inconsistency on that
issue. To the extent that survey nonresponse is itself a mechanism for reducing cogni-
tive dissonance (by refusing to acknowledge perceived voter-candidate disagreement), my
estimates of perceived spatial inconsistency levels will be biased downward.
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the beginnings and ends of the general election campaigns of 1976, 1980, and
2008. The light bars of each histogram represent voters whose candidate
preferences are spatially consistent (PSI ≤ 0) – that is, voters who perceive
their preferred candidate to be at least as proximate in policy space as the
nearest alternative – while the dark bars indicate voters whose candidate
preferences are spatially inconsistent (PSI > 0).
For all three elections, the story told by these histograms is the same.
Overall, voters see themselves as closer to their preferred candidates (relative
to their non-preferred candidates) in the fall than in the summer. At the
beginning of the general election campaign season, even before the candidates
have been officially crowned as their parties’ nominees at the conventions,
most voters already perceive their preferred candidate as being the better
analog for their issue positions (or at least as good as the alternative). The
size of the minority of voters with spatially inconsistent preferences shrinks
between the summer and fall waves of each panel, and the overall distribution
of voters shifts leftward on the perceived spatial inconsistency axis. Simply
put, the average voter’s candidate preference and conceptualization of policy
space are less likely to cause her to experience cognitive dissonance at the
end of the general election campaign than at the beginning.
Determining the conditions under which these perceived voter-candidate
gaps arise is not the central focus of this dissertation, but a cursory explo-
ration into the determinants of perceived spatial inconsistency may provide










































































Figure 4.1: Change in Perceived Spatial Inconsistency in Three U.S.
Presidential Elections (dark bars indicate voters with spatially inconsistent
candidate preferences)
initial perceived spatial inconsistency as the dependent variable and a set of
“usual suspects” for the independent variables: sex, age, education7, income
(as a percentile of the sample), attention to politics8, whether respondents
7Education was captured using two indicator variables: one for respondents with a high
school diploma or GED but no four-year college degree, and one for respondents with at
least a four-year college degree. The omitted category is thus respondents with no high
school diploma or GED. Respondents declining to report education levels are omitted.
8This attention measure is based on self-reports on a three-point scale in 1976 and 1980
and a five-point scale in 2008. All three are rescaled to range from 0 to 1 in the models
reported here, where 0 represents the least attentive to politics and 1 represents the most
attentive to politics.
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supported the Democratic presidential candidate at the beginning of the
general election campaign, and partisan and ideological extremity (based on
folded-over seven-point ideology and partisanship items).
The results of these three linear regressions (displayed in Table 4.1) offer
three clues as to the origins of perceived spatial inconsistency. First, the
coefficient on attention to politics is negative in all three models and sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level in the 1980 and 2008 models (in the
1976 model, it narrowly escapes statistical significance). One interpretation
of this finding is that more attentive respondents may have been thinking
about the prospective candidate slates in advance of the party conventions,
and therefore may have already formulated spatially consistent candidate
preferences (either through proximity voting or motivated reasoning) by the
time of the general election campaign. Second, the coefficient on ideologi-
cal extremity is also statistically significant and negative in 1980 and 2008
(and also negative and nearly significant in 1976). Committed liberals and
conservatives appear to begin the general election season with less perceived
spatial inconsistency, perhaps due to the fact that their issue positions are
more ideologically constrained and therefore more likely to jibe with those
of their preferred candidate. Third, the coefficient on support for the Demo-
cratic candidate is statistically significant and negative in 1976 and 2008 and
statistically significant and positive in 1980. Although I have only three elec-
tions’ worth of panel data to work with, it is suggestive that in each of them
perceived spatial inconsistency starts out higher on average for supporters of
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the candidate from the incumbent party. It is possible that out-party can-
didates who lack well-known résumés are easier targets for projection at the
primary election stage, or that voters who support them without knowing
their issue positions give them the benefit of the doubt and assume agreement
early on in the campaign season.9
Variation in Motivated Reasoning Levels across Issues
Average perceived spatial inconsistency decreases over the course of the gen-
eral election campaign in a way that is consistent with motivated reasoning.
But is this decrease more prevalent on certain issues than others, or are most
issues equally susceptible to motivated reasoning? To answer this question,
I begin by decomposing perceived spatial inconsistency into issue-specific
measures. Because issue positions and candidate perceptions are measured
using a seven-point scale, these issue-specific perceived spatial inconsistency
values vary from −7 to 7. Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 display the average dis-
sonance reduction by issue and candidate support for 1976, 1980, and 2008,
respectively.
Several patterns are evident here. First, of the 42 combinations of issue
and candidate support, 40 exhibited an average decrease in perceived spatial
inconsistency (the exceptions being Reagan supporters on inflation in 1980
9Even though 2008 Republican nominee John McCain was not a sitting president, he
agreed with many of incumbent George W. Bush’s stances and was criticized by his
Democratic opponent Barack Obama and others as representing “four more years of the
same Bush policies” (Danner 2008).
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Table 4.1: OLS Regression, Determinants of Initial Perceived Spatial
Inconsistency
Variable 1976 1980 2008
Male −0.021 −0.002 −0.017
(0.024 ) (0.022 ) (0.017 )
Age 0.000 −0.002* 0.000
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
High school −0.011 −0.136*** −0.020
(0.035 ) (0.034 ) (0.046 )
College −0.014 0.013 −0.017
(0.030 ) (0.028 ) (0.019 )
Income (percentile) −0.056 −0.013 −0.034
(0.047 ) (0.046 ) (0.034 )
Attention −0.066 −0.076* −0.083*
(0.034 ) (0.037 ) (0.037 )
Supports Democrat −0.091*** 0.081*** −0.162***
(0.027 ) (0.024 ) (0.018 )
Partisan extremity 0.002 −0.026 −0.028**
(0.016 ) (0.014 ) (0.009 )
Ideological extremity −0.020 −0.039** −0.030***
(0.012 ) (0.014 ) (0.009 )
Constant 0.054 0.193** 0.170**
(0.074 ) (0.062 ) (0.059 )
R2 0.07 0.17 0.23
Number of observations 293 334 477
Dependent variable: Perceived spatial inconsistency at start of general
election campaign
Standard errors in parentheses
Omitted education category: No high school diploma
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Figure 4.2: Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by Issue and
Candidate Support, 1976
and Obama supporters on detention of terror suspects in 2008). Second,
within each election dissonance reduction is broadly similar across issues,
even when initial levels of relative proximity are not. The major exceptions
to this similarity can be easily reconciled by consulting the political science
literature. In 1976, change is minimal on the issue of abortion for both
Carter and Ford supporters, consistent with past research that suggests that
attitudes about morally-charged issues are less liable to change (Converse
and Markus 1979; Markus and Converse 1979). In 1980, average dissonance
reduction is largest for both Carter and Reagan supporters on the issue of












































Figure 4.3: Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by Issue and
Candidate Support, 1980
during the campaign as he pivoted to a more hawkish stance (Lenz 2012);
this shifting may have given both his supporters and his opponents leeway to
perceive him as close or as far away as would justify their candidate preference
(Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012).
Although the average reduction in perceived spatial inconsistency is simi-
lar for most issues, this similarity does not necessarily indicate that individual
voters spread their motivated reasoning efforts across multiple issues. Such
a pattern could just as well be observed in an electorate consisting of voters
who each motivatedly reason about one issue, provided that each issue is




























































Figure 4.4: Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by Issue and
Candidate Support, 2008
sess voters’ motivated reasoning strategies, we must move from the aggregate
level to the individual level.
Issue Balance and Dissonance Reduction
My multi-issue hypothesis suggests that voters will spread their motivated
reasoning efforts across multiple issues. This diffusion allows them to achieve
substantial reductions in perceived spatial inconsistency (and therefore cogni-
tive dissonance) without having to drastically adjust any single issue position
or candidate perception. By invoking motivated reasoning on more than one
issue, voters can effectively rationalize their candidate preferences in terms
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of issue proximity without completely subjugating their original conceptual-
izations of policy space to directional concerns.
Determining whether voters exhibit these multi-issue strategies requires
a measurement of how balanced their motivated reasoning efforts are across
issues. I construct this measure for voters who reduced perceived spatial in-
consistency on at least one issue by calculating what proportion of a voter’s
total reduction in perceived spatial inconsistency occurs on each issue (treat-
ing any within-issue increases in perceived spatial inconsistency as zeroes),
taking the standard deviation of this set of proportions, dividing this stan-
dard deviation by its maximum possible value, and finally subtracting this
quotient from one. This yields an “issue balance” score, for which a value
of 0 indicates the least balanced motivated reasoning strategy (reducing per-
ceived spatial inconsistency on only one issue) and a value of 1 indicates
the most balanced motivated reasoning strategy (reducing perceived spatial
inconsistency equally across all available issues).
Figure 4.5 displays histograms of issue balance scores for each of the
three elections, demonstrating how single-issue studies of motivated reason-
ing fail to capture the complexity of voters’ rationalization efforts. Although
some panel respondents (represented by the left-most bar in each histogram)
exhibit perfectly imbalanced motivated reasoning strategies – that is, they
increase the relative proximity of their preferred candidate on only one issue
– these represent a minority of respondents in all three cases.10
10The percentages of respondents who increased their preferred candidate’s relative prox-






































Figure 4.5: Issue Balance of Motivated Reasoning Efforts
My theory suggests that voters spread their motivated reasoning efforts
across multiple issues for the sake of cognitive efficiency. If this were true,
I would expect a negative relationship between issue balance and change
in perceived spatial inconsistency, driven by the fact that voters with more
ground to cover in policy space have greater impetus to pursue cognitively
efficient, multi-issue strategies. Figure 4.6 corroborates this expectation:
respondents whose motivated reasoning is confined to a single issue tend to
reduce perceived spatial inconsistency significantly less than respondents who
invoke multi-issue strategies.
This negative relationship between issue balance and change in perceived
spatial inconsistency is not merely a function of many large adjustments
doing more to reduce perceived spatial inconsistency than few large adjust-
percentage of single-issue motivated reasoners is higher in 1980 than in 1976 and 2008,
most probably because the 1980 ANES panel featured only four issue scales and thus
gave respondents half as many opportunities to narrow the gap as respondents in the
2008-2009 ANES panel had and less than half as many opportunities as were available








































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.6: Issue Balance and Change in Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
ments. As I will show in Chapter 6, these most balanced, most effective
motivated reasoners primarily rely on many small steps to alleviate cognitive
dissonance rather than many giant leaps. At the start of the general election
campaign, most voters are not so out of step with their preferred candidates
on so many issues as to be able to “score” this high on issue balance by any
means other than making adjustments on multiple issues that are small by
themselves but add up to a big effect on perceived voter-candidate agreement.
Motivated Reasoners in Multi-Issue Policy Space
These findings suggest that single-issue theories and studies of motivated
reasoning tell only part of the story of how voters rationalize their candi-
date preferences with respect to issue proximity. Voters abide in complex
campaign environments where they can mitigate perceived voter-candidate
disagreement on more than one issue. Not only are these multi-issue mo-
tivated reasoning strategies prevalent in the American electorate, they are
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also more effective in terms of alleviating the cognitive dissonance that stems
from inconsistent candidate preferences.
How should results from single-issue studies of motivated reasoning about
issue positions be interpreted in light of these findings? I submit that the
sizes of persuasion and projection effects from research designs that deal
with only one issue are likely to be overestimated. When voters are confined
to a unidimensional policy space and encouraged to reduce perceived voter-
candidate disagreement, their options are much more limited than they would
be in the complex campaign environments of real presidential elections, and
they may be forced to make large adjustments to their self- and candidate
placements on a single issue in order to achieve what they could do less





I am new enough on the national political scene that I serve as a
blank screen on which people of vastly different political stripes
project their own views.
—Barack Obama
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that most voters spread their
motivated reasoning efforts across multiple issues, and that these multi-issue
strategies are more effective at reducing perceived spatial inconsistency and
cognitive dissonance. While doing so, I was agnostic to the specific motivated
reasoning processes that brought about those reductions; I merely examined
changes in the relative proximity of voters’ preferred candidates at two points
in time without regard for how much persuasion or projection (and, within
projection, assimilation or contrast) contributed to those changes.
Multi-process motivated reasoning is trickier to gauge than multi-issue
motivated reasoning. Issue scales can be neatly analyzed separately from
one another, because changes in voters’ self- and candidate placements on
one issue do not affect the measurement of changes in their self- and candi-
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date placements on another issue. Not so with persuasion and projection.
Persuasion, characterized as it is by voters’ positions being drawn to where
they perceive their preferred candidates to stand, is much more easily mea-
sured when those candidate perceptions are fixed in policy space. When
projection is happening simultaneously, those perceptions need not be fixed,
and trying to determine whether and how much persuasion should be cred-
ited with reducing voter-candidate disagreement relative to projection is like
trying to determine how far north one has traveled when the North Pole
itself is traveling. The same is true of projection, which is defined relative
to voters’ own issue positions. Several studies of persuasion and projection
have used simultaneous equation modeling to compare these processes’ im-
pacts (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979), but, as we have
seen, these aggregate estimates are of little use for illuminating individual
motivated reasoning strategies.
In this chapter, I introduce a method for estimating persuasion, assimila-
tion, and contrast effects at the level of the individual voter, using counterfac-
tuals to decompose overall reductions in perceived spatial inconsistency into
separate reductions attributable to specific processes. I apply this method
to the three panels examined in Chapter 4. Consistent with my theory, I
find that voters tend to employ multi-process motivated reasoning strategies
that are more effective at alleviating cognitive dissonance the more “bal-
anced” they are among persuasion, assimilation, and contrast. Additionally,
I present evidence suggesting that this multi-process reduction in perceived
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spatial inconsistency is not merely accuracy motivated reasoning (i.e., cue-
taking from and learning about the candidates) masquerading as directional
motivated reasoning. Finally, I consider the possibility that reprioritization
– the changing of issue importance ratings to downplay voter-candidate dis-
agreement – may also be a motivated reasoning process at play in voters’
rationalization efforts, though its impact on motivated reasoning about is-
sue positions turns out to be tertiary compared to those of persuasion and
projection.
Measuring Multi-Process Motivated Reasoning
In principal, the overall effect of motivated reasoning on perceived spatial
inconsistency should be just as decomposable into separate process effects as
it was into separate issue effects in Chapter 4. However, quantifying those
separate process effects is less intuitive due to the presence of “moving tar-
gets” in the form of voters’ issue positions and candidate perceptions. One
who is interested in measuring perceived spatial inconsistency reduction on
the issue of government spending can safely ignore what is happening on the
issue of foreign policy, but one who is interested in measuring perceived spa-
tial inconsistency reduction attributable to changes in voters’ self-placements
cannot safely ignore changes in where voters place the candidates.
As an illustration, suppose that a voter moved herself from 1 to 6 on
a seven-point issue scale over the course of the general election campaign
while also moving her perception of her preferred candidate from 7 to 2
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on the same scale. Assuming her placement of her non-preferred candidate
stayed constant her net reduction in perceived voter-candidate disagreement
is 2 intervals (6 − 4). She moved both herself and her preferred candidate
5 intervals in policy space, so it seems reasonable to say that persuasion
and assimilation were equally responsible for this reduction. But how large
was each separate process effect? The voter moved herself 5 intervals closer
to her preferred candidate’s starting position but 4 intervals farther from
her preferred candidate’s ending position. Using her preferred candidate’s
starting position as the “target” seems to overstate the persuasion effect,
but using her preferred candidate’s ending position seems to understate the
persuasion effect.
To account for the complicated dynamics of voters’ conceptualizations
of policy space, I use counterfactuals to estimate the impacts of persuasion,
assimilation, and contrast on perceived spatial inconsistency reduction. For
persuasion, I begin by calculating how much a voter’s perceived spatial in-
consistency would have changed if her initial candidate perceptions did not
change between the beginning and end of the campaign. That calculation is
given here:
(√∑











where Vi1 represents the voter’s self-placement on issue i at time 1 (the start
of the general election campaign), Pi1 and Ni1 do likewise for the voter’s pre-
ferred and non-preferred candidate placements, and Vi2 represents the voter’s
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self-placement on issue i at time 2 (the end of the general election campaign).
I then calculate how much a voter’s perceived spatial inconsistency would
have changed if her final candidate perceptions had been constant through-
out the campaign, using the following calculation:
(√∑











which is identical to the previous equation except in that voter’s initial candi-
date placements (Pi1 and Ni1) are replaced with their final candidate place-
ments (Pi2 and Ni2). These two estimates are averaged to calculate the
voter’s overall persuasion effect. Similar procedures yield individual-level es-
timates of assimilation and contrast effects by holding all but Pi and all but
Ni constant, respectively.
1
This procedure generates estimates of how much of each voter’s reduction
in perceived spatial inconsistency can be attributed to persuasion, assimila-
tion, and contrast. I can convert each process estimate to a proportion by
dividing it by the sum of all the process estimates (after converting posi-
tive process estimates to zeroes) and then use these proportions to generate
“process balance” scores the same way I generated issue balance scores in
Chapter 4.2 As with issue balance, a process balance score of 0 indicates
that a voter reduced perceived spatial inconsistency through exactly one mo-
tivated reasoning process, while a score of 1 indicates that a voter depended
1The specifications for assimilation and contrast are reported in Appendix B.
2A positive process estimate indicates that the net impact of that process was to increase
perceived spatial inconsistency and cognitive dissonance.
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upon each motivated reasoning process equally.
Process Balance and Dissonance Reduction
Just as the distributions of issue balance scores lent credence to my multi-
issue hypothesis in Chapter 4, the distributions of process balance scores
shown in Figure 5.1 suggest that single-process motivated reasoners (those
who score 0 on process balance) represent only about a quarter of all mo-
tivated reasoners in these three campaigns; the percentages of respondents
who increased their preferred candidate’s relative proximity through only a
single process were 27.2% in 1976, 28.4% in 1980, and 20.6%. More com-
monly, perceived spatial inconsistency is reduced through combinations of
persuasion, assimilation, and contrast effects.
Issue balance was shown to be associated with greater reductions in per-
ceived spatial inconsistency in Chapter 4, consistent with my claim that
spreading out motivated reasoning efforts across issues is more cognitively ef-
ficient. Figure 5.2 displays a similar relationship between process balance and
change in perceived voter-candidate disagreement. Single-process motivated
reasoners generally achieve little in terms of increasing the relative proximity
of their preferred candidates when compared to their more process-balanced
counterparts. Overall, strategies that draw on multiple processes to com-
bat perceived spatial inconsistency accomplish larger reductions in cognitive
dissonance than strategies that stick to a single process. Even though very






































Figure 5.1: Process Balance of Motivated Reasoning Efforts
of them are reducing perceived spatial inconsistency through more than one
process is a phenomenon that slips under the radars of single-process research
designs.
Motivated Reasoning or Unbiased Information Gathering?
Up until this point, I have operated on the assumption that changes in vot-
ers’ conceptualizations of policy space which reduce perceived spatial in-
consistency are the result of directional motivated reasoning. However, ra-
tionalization is not the only reason why voters might report less perceived
voter-candidate disagreement at the end of the general election campaign
compared to the beginning. Accuracy motivated reasoning could alleviate
cognitive dissonance if voters, in the act of learning the candidates’ stances
and taking cues from perceived policy experts, update their issue positions
and candidate perceptions in ways that increase the relative proximity of their















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.2: Process Balance and Change in Perceived Spatial Inconsistency
ing with directional motivated reasoning can lead to inaccurate conclusions
about citizen competence, as it risks classifying normatively desirable behav-
ior (becoming more informed about candidates and issues) as normatively
problematic behavior (persuasion, assimilation, and contrast).
The fact that changes in perceived spatial inconsistency are considerably
biased in favor of reduction (as seen in Figure 4.1 on page 60) is evidence
against the alternative explanation that randomness is responsible for change,
but this does not rule out accuracy motivated reasoning as a possible con-
tributing factor. If, for example, a latent liberal Democrat begins the general
election campaign without knowing where she or either candidate stands on
some issues, learning and cue-taking could reduce her perceived spatial in-
consistency even if she was completely unbiased in her information gathering.
At face value, the patterns of persuasion, assimilation, and projection
in the three panels considered here suggest that learning may be an impor-
tant factor in cognitive dissonance reduction. Figure 5.3 displays the average
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shares of perceived spatial inconsistency reduction attributable to persua-
sion, assimilation, and contrast, suggesting that contrast was the dominant
process on average in 1976 and 2008 and about even with persuasion and
assimilation in 1980. This claim would seem to contradict much of the schol-
arly literature on projection, which nearly always finds greater assimilation
effects than contrast effects (Granberg and Brent 1974; 1980; Granberg and
Jenks 1977; Kinder 1978; King 1978; Sherrod 1971).3 However, voters tend
to have less knowledge of the positions of candidates they do not support
(Merrill, Grofman, and Adams 2001), which could cause them to learn more
about their non-preferred candidates over the course of the general election
campaign (because of ceiling effects with regard to their preferred candidates)
and therefore give the appearance of a substantial contrast effect.
Because accuracy motivated reasoning and directional motivated reason-
ing are observationally equivalent, there is no way to categorically separate
one from the other using observational survey data. To approximate how
much of what I have classified here as persuasion, assimilation, and contrast
effects may be attributable to learning and cue-taking, I recalculated those
process-specific effects without including any self- and candidate adjustments
that started at the midpoints of issue scales. Midpoint scale placements often
signal that respondents do not have well-formed issue positions or candidate
perceptions (Asher 1988; Presser and Schuman 1980). By separating adjust-
ments to midpoint placements from adjustments to other placements, I can
















































































Figure 5.3: Average Shares of Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by
Process.
estimate roughly how much reduction in cognitive dissonance is due to vot-
ers updating neutral, default positions and perceptions (which I designate
learning and cue-taking) compared to how much is attributable to changes
in non-neutral positions and perceptions (which I deem persuasion, assimi-
lation, and contrast).
Figure 5.4 again shows the average shares of perceived spatial inconsis-
tency reduction attributable to persuasion, assimilation, and contrast, but
with the learning and cue-taking components colored light grey.4 Three as-
pects of these decompositions are worth highlighting. First, cue-taking and
learning effects (as represented by the proxy of self- and candidate adjust-
ments from scale midpoints) do contribute to the increase in the relative
4The bar heights in Figure 5.4 do not match those in Figure 5.3 because the method
of disaggregating adjustments into directional-motivated and accuracy-motivated com-
ponents sometimes results in different estimates of how much reduction in perceived
voter-candidate disagreement is due to changes in self-placements, changes in preferred

















































































Figure 5.4: Average Shares of Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by
Process, Decomposed by Starting Placement (Light Parts of Bars Indicate
Reduction Attributed to Accuracy Motivated Reasoning)
proximity of voters’ preferred candidates during presidential campaigns. Sec-
ond, motivated reasoning (persuasion, assimilation, and contrast) does more
on average to reduce perceived voter-candidate disagreement than cue-taking
and learning. Third, the unusually high estimates of contrast effects in Figure
5.3 appear to be largely the result of voters learning about their non-preferred
candidates – indeed, accuracy motivation seems to account for a larger por-
tion of what was previously assumed to represent contrast effects than for
either persuasion or assimilation effects in all three elections. Cue-taking
and learning do alleviate cognitive dissonance, but not to the extent that
motivated reasoning does.
How is process balance affected by separating out cue-taking and learn-
ing effects from persuasion, assimilation, and contrast? Recalculating process
balance based on these new process shares increases both the average pro-
cess balance scores and the number of multi-process motivated reasoners in
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all three elections. Based on these new calculations, only 10.2% of respon-
dents in 1976, 25.0% in 1980, and 14.2% in 2008 rely on single-process mo-
tivated reasoning strategies, further underscoring the fact that single-issue,
single-process theories and studies of motivated reasoning about issue posi-
tions fail to account for how voters parse policy space in complex campaign
environments.
Issue Reprioritization: An Overlooked Motivated Reasoning
Process?
My theory of motivated reasoning about issue positions regards each issue
as a separate, equally-weighted dimension of policy space, such that any
perceived voter-candidate disagreement on one issue is just as dissonance-
inducing as a disagreement of the same size on another issue. This assump-
tion ignores the possibility that voters prioritize certain issues over others,
caring more about perceived spatial inconsistency on the issues they consider
most important than on issues which are of secondary or tertiary concern
(Converse 1964; Hutchings 2003; Iyengar 1990).
Taking into consideration heterogeneity in issue importance complicates
the estimation of perceived spatial inconsistency and cognitive dissonance.
It also introduces another potential means for voters to rationalize their
candidate preferences with regard to issue proximity: reprioritization, the
act of altering one’s issue importance ratings to downplay areas of per-
ceived voter-candidate disagreement and highlight areas of perceived voter-
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candidate agreement. Although reprioritization is almost never considered
alongside persuasion and projection as a process of candidate preference jus-
tification, it aligns neatly with the tendency of motivated reasoners to dis-
count dissonance-inducing information (Gaines et al. 2007; Groenendyk 2013;
Rudolph 2006) and offers the advantage of maintaining one’s self- and can-
didate placements on disagreeable issues while still ameliorating cognitive
dissonance.
To evaluate whether reprioritization plays a role comparable to persua-
sion, assimilation, and contrast in preference rationalization, I began by re-
calculating perceived spatial inconsistency to account for heterogeneity in
issue importance. This was accomplished by inserting respondents’ issue
importance ratings (Ii) into the equation on page 58:
√∑
((Vi − Pi)× Ii)2 −
√∑
((Vi −Ni)× Ii)2 (5.3)
Each of the three panel surveys considered here measured issue impor-
tance differently. The 1976 PCIV asked respondents to sort the nine issues
into groups of three: three most important issues, three least important is-
sues, and three issues of middling importance. The 1980 ANES asked respon-
dents to rate, on a scale from 0 to 100, how important it was that government
move policy to their preferred position on each issue. The 2008-2009 ANES
gave respondents five personal importance options for each issue: extremely
important, very important, moderately important, slightly important, and
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not important at all.5 I standardized these measures to interval scales such
that the lowest rating was always 0 and the highest rating was always 1.
Thus, at the extreme, voters were able to completely exclude a disagreeable
issue from their relative proximity calculation by assigning it a weight of 0.6
How does reprioritization compare to persuasion, assimilation, and con-
trast in terms of reducing perceived spatial inconsistency? Figure 5.5 shows
the average shares of perceived spatial inconsistency reduction by process
when reprioritization is included alongside the other three processes.7 In
all three elections considered here, reprioritization accounted for a smaller
portion of dissonance reduction than did persuasion, assimilation, or con-
trast. On average, reprioritzation appeared to do 14.6% of the work in 1976,
11.1% in 1980, and 14.2% in 2008.8 Moreover, some of this contribution may
reflect accuracy motivated reasoning (learning about what issues are most
important during the campaign) rather than directional motivated reasoning
(downweighting disagreeable issues on purpose).
Whether issue reprioritization operates in a way similar to persuasion
and projection in voters’ motivated reasoning strategies remains up for de-
5The specific question wordings for these issue importance ratings can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
6I chose to transpose the 1976 PCIV ratings to 0, 0.5, and 1, rather than using mid-range
estimates for the least and most important categories (0.125 and 0.875, respectively) to
preserve this option of assigning a zero-weight to an issue.
7The persuasion, assimilation, and contrast bars in Figure 5.5 do not match those in
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 because they were calculated using issue importance weights.
8At the individual level, reprioritization was the least impactful motivated reasoning pro-
cess for 91.1% of respondents in the 1976 PCIV, 92.8% of respondents in the 1980 ANES
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Figure 5.5: Average Shares of Perceived Spatial Inconsistency Reduction by
Process, Including Reprioritization
bate. Political scientists are divided over how well the importance survey
respondents place on particular issues represents how much each issue actu-
ally impacts their attitudes and decision-making (Grynaviski and Corrigan
2006; Malhotra and Tahk 2011; Wlezien 2005). At the very least, factoring
importance ratings into the measurement of perceived spatial inconsistency
renders policy space much more complicated in terms of voters’ ability to
parse it. Additionally, my näıve approach of converting issue importance
ratings to a 0-to-1 linear scale may not accurately capture what these rat-
ings mean to voters.9 Nevertheless, there is at least some evidence here that
the dynamics of issue importance ratings influence voters’ perceptions of the
relative proximity of their preferred candidates in policy space.
9This is especially true of the 1976 PCIV, whose unusual tripartite ranking system for
gauging issue importance offered minimal opportunities for respondents to indicate nu-
anced importance ratings.
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Multi-Issue, Multi-Process Motivated Reasoners
That voters modify their conceptualizations of policy space to justify their
candidate preferences has been well-established in the political psychology
literature. However, how voters achieve this justification – which specific
motivated reasoning strategies they employ to alleviate cognitive dissonance
– has in the past only been conjectured. Artificial constraints imposed upon
voters in motivated reasoning studies have enabled political scientists to iso-
late single motivated reasoning processes on single issues, but these effects
observed in isolation do not necessarily resemble what actually takes place
among voters in their natural habitat. At best, single-issue, single-process
studies reveal only one facet of the motivated reasoning that takes place
over the course of a campaign as the pressure to agree with one’s preferred
candidate is ratcheted up.
In this and the previous chapter, I have assessed how voters cope with
perceived spatial inconsistency when left to their own devices in multi-issue
environments and with persuasion, assimilation, and contrast (and perhaps
reprioritization) all at their disposal. The results of this assessment match
my expectations. Voters who engage in motivated reasoning tend to do so
on more than one issue and through more than one process – and the more
they spread out their motivated reasoning efforts across issues and processes,
the larger their reductions in perceived spatial inconsistency.
The findings reported in this chapter bespeak a complexity of voters’ mo-
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tivated reasoning strategies that goes undetected by single-process studies.
When survey or experiment participants are presented with fixed candidate
placements on issues scales or asked to provide self-placements which are then
treated as fixed, the means by which they are able to reduce perceived spatial
inconsistency and cognitive dissonance are severely constrained. Forcing re-
spondents to use any one motivated reasoning process or none at all is likely




Motivated Reasoning and Citizen Competence
You never agree with any one candidate 100 percent. I don’t
agree with myself 100 percent.
—Rudy Giuliani
When voters undertake the task of rationalizing their candidate prefer-
ences in terms of issue proximity, they tend to do so on more than one issue
and through more than one motivated reasoning process (persuasion, as-
similation, contrast, and perhaps reprioritization). These multi-issue, multi-
process strategies arise out of voters’ desire to minimize the cognitive costs
they incur while trying to alleviate the cognitive dissonance stemming from
their discordant candidate preferences. Spreading cognitive effort across is-
sues and processes allows voters to reduce perceived spatial inconsistency
more efficiently than they could by focusing on a single issue or process.
The evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 5 clearly tells a different tale
from the one told by the single-issue, single-process theories and studies that
dominate the persuasion and projection literature, but are these two tales
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substantively distinct? If motivated reasoning efforts impact public opinion
and voter decision-making identically regardless of how they are allocated,
there is little use in complicating their measurement as I have done here to
account for multi-issue, multi-process strategies.
In this chapter, I argue that the rationalization strategies documented in
Chapters 4 and 5 do matter for our understanding of the relationship between
motivated reasoning and citizen competence. First, the act of spreading mo-
tivated reasoning across issues and processes reduces its impact on attitude
stability, allowing individual self- and candidate placements to remain fairly
stable even as perceived spatial inconsistency is alleviated. Second, because
voters consider the full range of issues when evaluating candidate proxim-
ity, they are willing and able to sustain some areas of relative disagreement
with their preferred candidates (provided that those candidates still appears
to be the most proximate options). Third, voters’ inclination toward small
steps rather than giant leaps means that their appetite for motivated rea-
soning about issue positions is not limitless: beyond a certain threshold of
perceived spatial inconsistency, switching candidate preferences becomes the
more desirable option. Fourth and finally, motivated reasoning about issue
positions does appear to impact “correct voting” (narrowly defined as based
solely on perceived spatial inconsistency), but not egregiously so.
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Motivated Reasoning and Attitude Instability: Small Steps or Gi-
ant Leaps?
The question of how stable the public’s political attitudes are over time
weighs heavily on questions of democratic theory. If public opinion is fickle
and changes regularly for spurious reasons, democratic representation based
on voters’ issue positions seems less advisable for good governance (Converse
1964; Feldman 1989; Krosnick 1991; Pierce and Rose 1974). Persuasion and
projection, being the biased adjustment of self- and candidate placements on
issue scales, threaten to destabilize public opinion in the process of rational-
izing candidate preferences.
Does motivated reasoning about issue positions lead to wild distortions
of voters’ conceptualizations of policy space? An examination of self- and
candidate adjustments in the 1976 PCIV, 1980 ANES, and 2008-2009 ANES
panel studies suggests the answer is no. Figure 6.1 displays bar graphs of
all the single-issue self- and candidate adjustments from these panels, bro-
ken down by election and by which political actor (the voter, her preferred
candidate, or her non-preferred candidate) was being moved in policy space.
Across all subsets, at least a supermajority (more than 60%) of self- and can-
didate placements either do not change between the summer and fall panel
waves or change by only one interval on a seven-point scale.1
1For voters’ issue positions, these percentages was 73.1% in 1976, 64.0% in 1980, and
67.9% in 2008. For voters’ perceptions of their preferred candidates, the corresponding
percentages were 62.7% in 1976, 66.5% in 1980, and 62.1% in 2008. For voters’ perceptions
of their non-preferred candidates, the percentages were 62.6%, 60.4%, and 63.1%.
90





























































































































































































Figure 6.1: Individual Self- and Candidate Adjustment Sizes by Year
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Even though perceived voter-candidate disagreement shrinks substan-
tially over the course of each of these presidential campaigns, the multi-
issue, multi-process nature of voters’ motivated reasoning strategies enables
them to justify their candidate preferences without relying on huge single-
placement adjustments. Whether these snapshots of attitude instability are
reassuring or disquieting depends largely on one’s priors, but for the pur-
poses of this dissertation what is noteworthy is that motivated reasoning is
not radically distorting voters’ individual positions and perceptions. A few
small steps for self- and candidate placements can mean a giant leap for
perceived spatial inconsistency without also radically redefining one’s con-
ceptualization of policy space.
Survival of Disagreement among Motivated Reasoners
One of the most commonly cited downsides of motivated reasoning in politics
is that it blinds voters to areas of disagreement between themselves and their
preferred candidates. Voters’ willingness to contort their issue positions to
maintain agreement with the parties and politicians they support presents
an obstacle to issue representation and democratic accountability: the more
voters follow, the less able they are to lead (Cohen 2003; Gaines et al. 2007;
Groenendyk 2013; Lenz 2012). Acknowledging individual disagreements with
a preferred candidate – even if that candidate is in fact the “lesser of two
evils” in terms of issue proximity – is a valuable political ability, as it enables
voters to accurately evaluate the quality of their representation and to reward
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more proximate candidates should they come along.
Does motivated reasoning about issue positions wipe out voters’ disagree-
ments with their preferred candidates? To answer this question, I counted
the number of “disagreements” (defined as issues on which a voter placed
herself closer to her non-preferred candidate than to her preferred candi-
date) reported by respondents in the fall waves of the 1976, 1980, and 2008
panels. 60.1% of respondents in 1976 harbored at least one disagreement at
the end of the general election campaign, compared to 35.4% in 1980 and
70.0% in 2008.2 However, these individual disagreements did not tend to
prove catastrophic in terms of cognitive dissonance. Using simple logistic re-
gressions, I calculated predicted probabilities of having a spatially consistent
candidate preference (PSI ≤ 0) by number of disagreements for each of the
three elections, shown in Figure 6.2.3 Voters are able to report up to 3 dis-
agreements in 1976, up to 1 disagreement in 1980, and up to 3 disagreements
in 2008 and still be more likely than not to have a nonpositive perceived
spatial inconsistency score.4
The fact that individual disagreements persist without driving voters to
2Recall that the 1980 ANES panel only asked four seven-point issue questions compared
to nine in the 1976 PCIV and eight in the 2008-2009 ANES, which may explain why the
number of respondents in 1980 who reported at least one disagreement was much smaller
– there was simply less about which to disagree.
3The first and last confidence intervals in each plot have no substantive interpretation.
A voter who disagrees with her preferred candidate on zero issues will necessarily have
nonpositive perceived spatial inconsistency; a voter who disagrees with her preferred
candidate on all issues will necessarily have nonnegative perceived spatial inconsistency.
4Once again, the smaller value for 1980 is most likely a reflection of its circumscribed







































































































Figure 6.2: Predicted Probability of Final PSI ≤ 0 by Number of
Voter-Candidate “Disagreements”
rectify them demonstrates the importance of treating proximity voting and
motivated reasoning as the multi-issue phenomena they are. Single-issue
studies that find substantial motivated reasoning effects may be overstating
voters’ compulsion to rationalize their candidate preferences by effectively
reducing policy space to a single dimension. When voters are asked to place
themselves and the candidates on only one issue scale, placing themselves
closer to their non-preferred candidates is an uncomfortable admission that
their preferences are not justified by issue proximity. When multiple issues
are considered, disagreeing with one’s preferred candidate on one or more
issues becomes tolerable as long as the respondent believes that the overall
balance of policy considerations justifies her candidate preference.
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Perceived Spatial Inconsistency and Preference Switching
The survival of individual voter-candidate disagreements in spite of persua-
sion and projection suggests that motivated reasoners can withstand some
perceived spatial inconsistency, but can perceived spatial inconsistency with-
stand motivated reasoning? Is there a threshold of discord between conceptu-
alizations of policy space and candidate preferences beyond which motivated
reasoning becomes unwieldy and switching to a more proximate candidate
preferable? Motivated reasoning requires cognitive effort (Acharya, Black-
well, and Sen 2015), and experimental studies have found that voters give
up on rationalizing if the task is too hard or their cognitive load is too high
(Groenendyk 2013; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Do multi-
issue, multi-process strategies render motivated reasoners unstoppable?
If there is a limit to the amount of perceived spatial inconsistency that
voters can comfortably motivatedly reason away, we should expect to find
a positive relationship between perceived spatial inconsistency at the start
of the general election campaign and the likelihood that voters will have
switched candidate preferences by Election Day. Table 6.1 reports the re-
sults of logistic regressions testing this relationship, with controls for the
“usual suspects” of political behavior research. Initial perceived spatial in-
consistency is indeed a statistically significant predictor of preference switch-
ing in all three elections considered. Figure 6.3 displays this relationship
graphically: the probability that a voter will abandon her initial candidate
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preference increases sharply as perceived spatial inconsistency increases past
the midpoint of the scale (representing the point of indifference). However, as
indicated by the rug markers in Figure 6.3, very few voters begin the general
election campaign with especially high levels of perceived spatial inconsis-
tency – possibly because they have already accomplished their motivated
reasoning tasks before the major party nominating conventions.5
Multi-issue, multi-process motivated reasoning is a powerful tool for ra-
tionalizing candidate preferences. But it is not all-powerful. At high levels
of perceived spatial inconsistency, the number and size of the small steps
necessary to alleviate cognitive dissonance makes justification less attractive
than switching to the more proximate candidate.
Motivated Reasoning and Proximity Voting
The principal concern associated with motivated reasoning in politics – the
reason it occupies so much scholarly attention and creates such consternation
– is that it might lead voters to make bad decisions. As is true of many
“machines,” the quality of democracy’s output depends in part on the quality
of its input. Cottage industries have developed within political behavior and
political psychology to assess the extent to which voters are voting “correctly”
based on a variety of policy and non-policy considerations (Kuklinski and
Quirk 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2006), as well as whether individual votes
5Americans tend to become further entrenched in their candidate preferences as the cam-
paign wears on, and are less likely to switch allegiance late in the game compared to
citizens of other Western democracies (Blais 2004; Gelman and King 1993).
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Table 6.1: Logistic Regression, Determinants of Switching
Candidate Preference
Variable 1976 1980 2008
Initial PSI 2.327* 5.271*** 6.017***
(1.116 ) (1.147 ) (1.193 )
Male −0.240 −0.007 0.178
(0.436 ) (0.367 ) (0.351 )
Age −0.028 −0.014 0.027*
(0.016 ) (0.013 ) (0.012 )
High school 0.092 0.033 0.206
(0.643 ) (0.561 ) (0.851 )
College −0.761 0.225 0.331
(0.570 ) (0.437 ) (0.398 )
Income (percentile) −0.627 0.660 0.746
(0.857 ) (0.757 ) (0.703 )
Attention −0.960 0.770 −1.009
(0.618 ) (0.655 ) (0.718 )
Supports Democrat −0.329 −0.250 0.242
(0.457 ) (0.384 ) (0.368 )
Partisan extremity −0.698* −0.378 −0.142
(0.282 ) (0.228 ) (0.181 )
Ideological extremity −0.235 −0.848*** −0.582**
(0.230 ) (0.254 ) (0.189 )
Constant 2.406 −0.155 −2.371*
(1.266 ) (1.024 ) (1.163 )
McFadden’s R2 0.50 0.57 0.66
Number of observations 250 272 439
Dependent variable: Switched candidate preference
Omitted partisanship category: Independent/other
Standard errors in parentheses
































































































































































Figure 6.3: Predicted Probability of Switching Candidate Preference by
Initial Perceived Spatial Inconsistency (Shaded Areas Indicate 95%
Confidence Intervals)
need to be “correct” at all so long as the electorate “gets it right” in the
aggregate (Althaus 1998; 2003; Page and Shapiro 1992).
How many voters start with discordant candidate preferences and main-
tain those preferences throughout the campaign, reconfiguring their concep-
tualizations of policy space to justify them? Figure 6.4 shows the proportion
of non-switchers – those who reported backing the same candidate in the sum-
mer as they did in the fall – with perceived spatial inconsistency less than or
equal to 0 in three different circumstances: in the summer, after they have
“learned” (read: updated their midpoint self- and candidate placements),
and in the fall.6 Two things are readily apparent. First, learning and cue-
taking (as proxied by midpoint adjustments) do little to increase the share of
6This is not meant to suggest that learning takes place before motivated reasoning in
actual presidential campaigns. Rather, it suggests a hypothetical point in the campaign
when voters have updated their midpoint scale placements (used as a proxy for learning
and cue-taking) but have not adjusted any other self- or candidate placements.
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voters with spatially consistent candidate preferences – in fact, they reduce
that share in 1976 and 1980. Second, the share of spatially consistent voters
goes from 79.3% to 89.8% in 1976 (+10.4%), from 79.9% to 89.5% in 1980
(+9.6%), and from 79.7% to 89.8% in 2008 (+10.2%). If these self- and can-
didate adjustments are classified as persuasion and projection, roughly 10%
of voters are “fooling themselves”7 into voting incorrectly through motivated
reasoning.
It is important to stress that this operationalization of correct voting is
extremely blunt. It is based solely on relative candidate proximity in four-
to nine-dimensional policy space where all issues are assumed to be of equal
importance to voters. Moreover, it ignores any number of potentially rele-
vant considerations – retrospective economic evaluations, candidate quality,
group interests – that may reasonably factor into the correctness of a vote.
Consequently, the claim that roughly ten percent of voters are lured into
voting incorrectly as a consequence of motivated reasoning is probably an
overestimate. Nevertheless, it offers at least a ceiling for how often fudging
the numbers in voters’ conceptualizations of policy space actually leads them
to the “wrong” candidate preferences.
Can Motivated Reasoners Be Competent Citizens?
In presenting this chapter’s findings, I have deliberately glossed over the
$64,000 question of political behavior: are citizens competent?































































































Figure 6.4: Proportion of Non-Switchers with Spatially Consistent
Candidate Preferences (PSI ≤ 0)
This question has animated political science for as long as voter psychol-
ogy and decision-making have been studied. Today the debate continues
apace with no sign of stopping, and one dissertation narrowly focused on
motivated reasoning about issue positions is unlikely to put a stop to it.
What I can say based on the results presented here is that voters are neither
hyper-competent nor hypo-competent: motivated reasoning interferes with
good political judgment partially, but not completely. Readers who began
this chapter with high regard for American voters are likely to have lowered
their esteem, and readers who embarked with low regard for American voters
are likely to have raised theirs.8 This is a cop out, of course, but a middling
stance between straw-men extremes is the best answer that can be gleaned
from these findings.
8Unless, of course, those readers are motivated reasoners who have selectively interpreted
the information in this chapter so as to reinforce their preconceptions and come away
even more convinced of what they already thought about the American electorate.
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What I can say with confidence is that the cognitive cost of motivated
reasoning, by encouraging multi-issue, multi-process strategies, makes citi-
zens more competent than they would otherwise be. Because voters tend
to rely on small steps rather than giant leaps to rationalize their candidate
preferences, their issue positions and candidate perceptions remain relatively
stable and they are able to recognize and comfortably maintain at least some
perceived disagreements with their preferred candidates. Voters with high
levels of perceived spatial inconsistency are not so attached to their candi-
date preferences that they are unwilling to switch when motivated reasoning
is prohibitively demanding, and only a fraction of voters wind up with “in-
correct” votes as a consequence of motivated reasoning about issue positions
– probably fewer than my estimates suggest, given the many other considera-
tions which may matter for preference formation but which are unaccounted
for here. When motivated reasoning is examined in the complex campaign
environments that constitute voters’ natural habitat, its detrimental impacts




People have got to think. Thinking isn’t to agree or disagree.
That’s voting.
—Robert Frost
In democratic politics, cognitive dissonance is a double-edged sword.
Wanting to agree with the candidates we support on pressing policy mat-
ters compels us to choose the candidates who best represent our issue posi-
tions, which gives candidates a reason to stake out responsive, representative
platforms. Yet the very same impulse also tempts us to adjust our conceptu-
alizations of policy space to rationalize our candidate preferences, reducing
candidates’ incentives to hew to public opinion when they campaign and
govern. The balance of power between accuracy motivated reasoning and
directional motivated reasoning determines the extent to which voters are
sentinels of their policy interests as opposed to slaves to their candidate
affinities.
Fittingly, motivated reasoning about issue positions (whether or not it is
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explicitly acknowledged as such) has attracted considerable attention from
scholars of political behavior and political psychology. However, the theories
and studies generated by this attention have been hampered by their narrow
focus on how single processes (usually either persuasion or projection) op-
erate on single issues. In Chapter 2, I argued that these simplified theories
and research designs place unrealistic constraints on voters’ rationalization
capabilities that cast doubt on the generalizability of their results. Arti-
ficially fixing voters’ issue positions or candidate perceptions and reducing
policy space to a single issue fundamentally changes the problem of perceived
voter-candidate disagreement, and severely limits the motivated reasoning
strategies that can be brought to bear in response to the ensuing cognitive
dissonance.
What is needed to understand how voters invoke motivated reasoning in
complex campaign environments is an approach that recognizes the exten-
sive options they have for rationalizing discordant candidate preferences. To
that end, I offer a multi-issue, multi-process theory of motivated reasoning in
Chapter 3. Oriented toward the problem of reducing perceived spatial incon-
sistency, I theorize that voters will gravitate toward the motivated reasoning
strategies that offer the most bang for their buck – the most dissonance
reduction relative to the cognitive effort they will expend. These efficient
motivated reasoning strategies turn out to be spread out across both issues
and processes, a diffusion which can yield a substantial reduction in perceived
spatial inconsistency despite relying primarily on slight adjustments to vot-
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ers’ issue positions and candidate preferences. Not only are these multi-issue,
multi-process strategies undetectable by single-issue, single-process studies,
they are among the most useful and realistic means by which voters justify
their discordant candidate preferences.
Chapter 4 takes up the task of testing the multi-issue facet of this the-
ory. Using panel studies from three U.S. presidential elections, I show that
perceived spatial inconsistency decreases overall during the general election
campaign period, and that this decrease is spread out across issues at both
the aggregate and individual level. Most voters reduce cognitive dissonance
by making adjustments on multiple issues, tending to balance their efforts
across issues rather than expending lopsided efforts on single issues. This
multi-issue proclivity reduces the distortive effect of motivated reasoning on
any one issue position or candidate perception.
I shift from multi-issue motivated reasoning to multi-process motivated
reasoning in Chapter 5. Much of the challenge associated with studying per-
suasion and projection simultaneously at the individual level has been due to
the fact that the complicated dynamics of issue positions and candidate pref-
erences creates multiple moving targets, making clear effects estimations dif-
ficult. I confront these dynamics by estimating what the effect of each process
– persuasion, assimilation and contrast – would be in isolation of the others.
My findings demonstrate a tendency toward balanced, multi-process strate-
gies among motivated reasoners, akin to the balanced, multi-issue strategies
manifested in Chapter 4. Additionally, I present evidence against the claim
104
that these motivated reasoning strategies are merely unbiased learning and
cue-taking in disguise, and for the claim that issue reprioritization contributes
somewhat to voters’ cognitive dissonance reduction (though not as much as
persuasion, assimilation, and contrast do).
Chapter 6 takes the results from its two immediate predecessors and in-
terprets them in terms of citizen competence. Overall, the multi-issue, multi-
process nature of voters’ rationalization processes about issue positions ap-
pears to mitigate the problems associated with motivated reasoning. The
diffusion of motivated reasoning efforts across issues and processes keeps at-
titude instability relatively low and allows for the preservation of individual
voter-candidate disagreements (provided they are not too large or too nu-
merous). At the same time, multi-issue, multi-process motivated reasoners
are limited in their ability or willingness to rationalize especially disagreeable
candidate preferences, and only around ten percent of voters appear to be
voting “incorrectly” as a result of motivated reasoning that occurs during
the general election campaign (based on a purely proximity-driven definition
of correct voting). Although motivated reasoning about issue positions still
inhibits voters’ ability to accurately parse policy space, the severity of this
inhibition is reduced by the fact that motivated reasoners spread their efforts




One of this dissertation’s vulnerabilities is its reliance on data from only three
elections. This narrowness of scope is the unfortunate result of hunting where
the ducks are. For me to be able to apply my methodology to a data set in
a way that would generate within-subject measures of change in perceived
voter-candidate agreement, I needed A) self- and candidate placements B) on
more than one specific issue scale C) from the same respondents at more than
one point in time. Each of these criteria is severely limiting in its own right;
together, they make for slim pickings within the relatively small universe of
panel survey data (Leeper 2014).
Nevertheless, my “drunkard’s search” method of case selection is not in
and of itself a defense against the argument that these three elections – 1976,
1980, and 2008 – may be idiosyncratic. All three were victories for the out-
party. Two of the three featured Jimmy Carter. The oldest celebrated its
fortieth birthday last year, perhaps a relic of a bygone political past where
issue proximity simply worked differently. Even assuming that findings based
on these three panels accurately characterize American political psychology,
there remains a world of disparate electoral institutions and political cultures
where persuasion, projection, and proximity voting may well operate in vastly
different fashions (Drummond 2010; Kedar 2009).
Without having tested my theories in additional times and places, I can
offer only conjectures in response to these objections. My theory is grounded
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in the social psychology of cognitive dissonance and cognitive miserliness –
basic human compulsions to rationalize away contradictions and spend little
effort doing so. These desires are psychological, not political, in origin. They
are not the unique product of certain electoral systems or political cultures.
I suspect that I would observe similar multi-issue, multi-process dynamics if
my theory and methods were applied to other national executive elections in
the United States and abroad, and I intend to attempt to validate this ex-
pectation to the extent that data availability makes it possible. Determining
how much (if any) of the observations in this dissertation are specific to par-
ticular national, temporal, or electoral circumstances will be a critical part of
gaining a fuller understanding of motivated reasoning about issue positions.
Measuring Motivated Reasoning
If nothing else bears remembering from this dissertation, this admonition
should: single-issue, single-process studies cannot accurately describe how
voters motivatedly reason about issue positions. A persuasion study that
focuses only on government spending and does not allow for or measure
projection will overstate the extent to which voters engage in persuasion on
government spending in complex campaign environments; the same is true for
any other process and any other issue in isolation. Simplifying the problem
of voter-candidate disagreement in this fashion fundamentally changes both
the nature of the cognitive dissonance voters face and the options they have
for alleviating that cognitive dissonance.
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For demonstrating that persuasion or projection exists for certain voters
under certain circumstances, a single-issue, single-process research design
has some utility. For measuring how much of that process takes place in real
campaigns, such research designs are inadequate. Yes, voters may project
favorable views onto their preferred candidates on the issue of abortion when
only projection on only that issue is allowed. Would they project just as
much if they were permitted to adjust their own positions as well? What
if they could be persuaded or project on the issue of immigration as well?
Would not voter-candidate disagreement on one issue become more tolerable
when agreement on other issues could act as a counterweight? Without
giving voters access to these additional types of rationalization and measuring
whether and how they are invoked, we can only guess.1
Any scientific enterprise that endeavors to explain how something works
“in the real world” must ensure that its theories and research designs resem-
ble the real world in which the phenomenon under investigation takes place.
Too often in motivated reasoning research, simplicity comes at the price of
verisimilitude, which leads to studies that ask one question (how do vot-
ers rationalize discordant candidate preferences?) and answer a completely
different one (how would they rationalize discordant candidate preferences
if they could only do it like this?). As I have argued here, the myopia of
1A single-issue approach might suffice when examining the motivated reasoning tendencies
of issue publics who disdain all issues except for the one being evaluated (Converse 1964;
Iyengar 1990). These, however, are extreme cases, and are still vulnerable to the pitfalls
of single-process studies if they permit persuasion or projection but not both.
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single-issue, single-process designs causes political scientists to miss the for-
est for the trees when it comes to the dynamics of perceived voter-candidate
agreement.
Beyond Issue Voting
Issue proximity, despite not being the only legitimate consideration in can-
didate preference formation, enjoys a privileged position in the pantheon
of voter decision-making criteria. Both academic and popular theories of
democracy extol the virtues of the voter who puts aside petty partisan prej-
udices and carefully considers the issues at stake (Dalton 2008; Klar and
Krupnikov 2016), with some awarding bonus points to those who do so with
ideological rigor (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Many political
scientists have given up hope that this responsible, ideologically-constrained
citizenship has been, is now, or ever shall be standard or even common in
democratic polities; nevertheless, candidates, journalists, and pundits per-
petuate the kabuki theatre that is issue-centric campaigns.
My examination of motivated reasoning is limited to the arena of policy
space. However, just as I have demonstrated that a multi-issue, multi-process
perspective of motivated reasoning reveals additional strategies by which vot-
ers might rationalize their candidate preferences, expanding beyond the realm
of policy space might open up even more powerful and efficient ways of justify-
ing one’s candidate preference. If operating in multi-issue policy space affords
more leeway to motivated reasoners than does single-issue policy space, how
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much more flexibility would they enjoy when non-policy considerations are
factored into candidate preference formation and justification? The ambigu-
ity of abstract economic indicators (growth, unemployment), the complexity
of foreign policy entanglements, and the subjectivity of candidates’ personal
traits are all just as rationalizable (if not more so) as self- and candidate
placements on issue scales.
Attempting to account for motivated reasoning strategies that incorporate
non-policy factors in addition to issue proximity would be a daunting task,
both in terms of the plethora of considerations that might merit inclusion and
the challenge of formulating measurement strategies that can effectively com-
pare motivated reasoning across them all. I do not expect such an ambitious
undertaking to be accomplished soon, if ever. However, more circumscribed
studies of candidate preference rationalization (this dissertation included)
ought to recognize that their observations or experimental constructions of
campaign environments likely understate the number of criteria about which
voters could motivatedly reason and, consequently, the variety of strategies
available to voters.
Dissonance versus Democracy
In Federalist No. 10, James Madison warns, “As long as the connection
subsists between [man’s] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions
will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects
to which the latter will attach themselves.” The Founders were well aware of
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the perils of entrusting political power to the masses, not the least of which
was our propensity for biased information processing that would interfere
with sound political judgment. The American experiment has persisted in
spite of this bias, but continued existence is a low bar for success and is
certainly no excuse for complacency in the face of the motivated reasoning
that imbues voter decision-making.
How should viewing motivated reasoning about issue positions from a
multi-issue, multi-process perspective change our thinking about its impact
on democratic representation and accountability? I submit that the image of
motivated reasoning sketched in this dissertation is in some ways more prob-
lematic and in other ways less problematic than past studies have suggested.
On one hand, multi-issue, multi-process motivated reasoning is a much more
potent rationalization tool on account of its capacity for wringing consider-
able reductions in cognitive dissonance out of relatively minor adjustments
to voters’ conceptualizations of policy space. This diffusion of cognitive ef-
fort makes voters’ candidate preferences much harder to budge while also
making motivated reasoning more intractable. On the other hand, the fact
that directional goals can be accomplished through such minor adjustments
to voters’ issue positions and candidate perceptions reduces the distortive
impact of motivated reasoning on voters’ political cognition, increasing atti-
tude stability and allowing voters to comfortably admit to some individual
disagreements with their preferred candidates.
If cognitive dissonance imperils citizen competence and democratic ac-
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countability by encouraging voters to engage in motivated reasoning, cog-
nitive miserliness defends those same pillars of democratic governance by
channeling that motivated reasoning through multiple issues and processes.
Determining which of these forces wins out in terms of the electorate’s in-
ternal struggle between accuracy and directional motivations is beyond this
dissertation’s bailiwick. The ubiquity of motivated reasoning demands the
attention of those concerned with the quality of democratic governance – but
that attention will only advance our understanding of political psychology
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Blais, André, Richard Nadeau, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. 2001.
“Measuring Strategic Voting in Multiparty Plurality Elections.” Electoral
Studies 20 (3): 343–352.
Brader, Ted. 2006. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Ap-
peals in Political Ads Work. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Brady, Henry E. and Paul M. Sniderman. 1985. “Attitude Attribution: A
Group Basis for Political Reasoning.” American Political Science Review
79 (4): 1061–1078.
Bragman, Walker. 2016. “Don’t Be Fooled – Hillary Clinton is No Progres-
sive.” The Huffington Post. February 11. http://www.huffingtonpost .
com/walker-bragman/hillary-clinton-is-no-pro b 9204690.html (January
1, 2017).
Brians, Craig Leonard and Martin P. Wattenberg. 1996. “Campaign Issue
Knowledge and Salience: Comparing Reception from TV Commercials,
TV News, and Newspapers.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1):
172–193.
Bullock, John G. 2011. “Elite Influence on Public Opinion in an Informed
Electorate.” American Political Science Review 66 (2): 429–449.
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E.
Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Carmines, Edward G. and James H. Kuklinski. 1990. “Incentives, Opportuni-
ties, and the Logic of Public Opinion in American Representative Democ-
114
racy.” In: Information and Democratic Processes. Urbana, IL: University
of Illinois Press.
Carsey, Thomas M. and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. “Changing Sides or
Changing Minds? Identification and Policy Preferences in the American
Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (2): 464–477.
Citrin, Jack. 1974. “Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Govern-
ment.” American Political Science Review 68 (3): 973–988.
Cohen, Geoffrey L. 2003. “Party over Policy: The Dominant Impact of Group
Influence on Political Beliefs.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy 85 (5): 808–822.
Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In:
Ideology and Discontent. Ed. by David E. Apter. New York: Free Press.
Converse, Philip E. and Gregory B. Markus. 1979. “Plus ça Change...: The
New CPS Election Study Panel.” American Political Science Review 73 (1):
32–49.
Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
— 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dalton, Russell J. 2008. The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is
Reshaping American Political Behavior. Washington: CQ Press.
Dancey, Logan and Paul Goren. 2010. “Party Identification, Issue Attitudes,
and the Dynamics of Political Debate.” American Journal of Political
Science 54 (3): 686–699.
Danner, Mark. 2008. “A Fateful Election.” New York Review of Books. Novem-
ber 6. http://http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2008/11/06/a-fateful-
election/ (January 1, 2017).
Dow, Jay and Michael Munger. 1990. “Public Choice in Political Science:
We Don’t Teach It, but We Publish It.” PS: Political Science & Politics
23 (4): 604–610.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Boston: Addison-
Wesley.
Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. “How Elite
Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation.” American Po-
litical Science Review 107 (1): 57–79.
Drummond, Andrew J. 2010. “Assimilation, Contrast and Voter Projections
of Parties in Left-Right Space: Does the Electoral System Matter?” Party
Politics 17 (6): 711–743.
115
Duch, Raymond M., Harvey D. Palmer, and Christopher J. Anderson. 2000.
“Heterogeneity in Perceptions of National Economic Conditions.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 44 (4): 635–652.
Enelow, James M. and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting:
An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Erikson, Robert S. and Christopher Wlezien. 2012. The Timeline of Presi-
dential Elections. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Feldman, Stanley. 1989. “Measuring Issue Preferences: The Problem of Re-
sponse Instability.” Political Analysis 1: 25–60.
Festinger, Leon. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fiske, Susan T. and Shelley E. Taylor. 2008. Social Cognition: From Brains
to Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Fortunato, David and Matthew V. Hibbing. 2016. “Pathologies of the Po-
litically Engaged Citizen.” Presented at the 74th Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Gaines, Brian J., James H. Kuklinski, Paul J. Quirk, Buddy Peyton, and Jay
Verkuilen. 2007. “Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Moti-
vation and Opinion on Iraq.” Journal of Politics 69 (4): 957–974.
Gamson, William A. 1968. Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1993. “Why Are American Presidential
Election Campaign Polls So Variable When Votes Are So Predictable?”
British Journal of Political Science 23 (4): 409–451.
Granberg, Donald and Edward Brent. 1974. “Dove-Hawk Placements in the
1968 Election: Application of Social Judgment and Balance Theories.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29 (5): 687–695.
— 1980. “Perceptions of Issue Positions of Presidential Candidates.” Amer-
ican Scientist 68 (6): 617–625.
Granberg, Donald and Richard Jenks. 1977. “Assimilation and Contrast Ef-
fects in the 1972 Election.” Human Relations 30 (7): 623–640.
Granberg, Donald and Carol Robertson. 1982. “Contrast Effects in Estimat-
ing Policies of the Federal Government.” Public Opinion Quarterly 46 (1):
43–53.
Greenwald, Anthony G., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Laurie A. Rudman, Shelly D.
Farnham, Brian A. Nosek, and Deborah S. Mellott. 2002. “A Unified The-
116
ory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept.”
Psychological Review 109 (1): 3–25.
Groenendyk, Eric W. 2013. Competing Motives in the Partisan Mind: How
Loyalty and Responsiveness Shape Party Identification and Democracy.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Grynaviski, Jeffrey D. and Bryce E. Corrigan. 2006. “Specification Issues
in Proximity Models of Candidate Evaluation (with Issue Importance).”
Political Analysis 14 (4): 393–420.
Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York:
Wiley.
Hensch, Mark. 2015. “Glenn Beck: Trump Is Not Conservative.” The Hill.
August 22. http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/gop-primaries/251721-
glenn-beck-trump-is-not-conservative (January 1, 2017).
Hogarth, Robin M. 1980. Judgment and Choice: The Psychology of Decision.
Chichester, England: Wiley.
Hutchings, Vincent L. 2003. Public Opinion and Democratic Accountability.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Iyengar, Shanto. 1990. “Shortcuts to Political Knowledge.” In: Information
and Democratic Processes. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.
Jacoby, William G. 1991. “Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes.”
American Journal of Political Science 35 (1): 178–205.
Kam, Cindy D. 2007. “When Duty Calls, Do Citizens Answer?” Journal of
Politics 69 (1): 17–29.
Kedar, Orit. 2009. Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate
for Power Sharing. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kenski, Kate and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. 2006. “Issue Knowledge and Per-
ceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential General Election.” Presi-
dential Studies Quarterly 36 (2): 243–259.
Key, V. O. Jr. 1966. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential
Voting 1936-60. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 1983. Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral
Effects of Economic Issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, Donald R. 1978. “Political Person Perception: The Asymmetrical
Influence of Sentiment and Choice on Perceptions of Presidential Candi-
dates.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (8): 859–871.
Kinder, Donald R. and Nathan P. Kalmoe. 2017. Neither Liberal nor Conser-
vative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
117
King, Michael. 1978. “Assimilation and Contrast of Presidential Candidates’
Issue Positions, 1972.” Public Opinion Quarterly 41 (4): 515–522.
Kirchick, James. 2016. “Hillary Clinton is 2016’s Real Conservative – Not
Donald Trump.” The Daily Beast. June 19. http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2016/06/09/hillary-clinton-is-2016-s-real-conservative-not-
donald-trump.html (January 1, 2017).
Klar, Samara and Yanna Krupnikov. 2016. Independent Politics: How Ameri-
can Disdain for Parties Leads to Political Inaction. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Knight, Kathleen. 1985. “Ideology in the 1980 Election: Ideological Sophis-
tication Does Matter.” Journal of Politics 47 (3): 828–853.
Krause, Merton S. 1972. “An Analysis of Festinger’s Cognitive Dissonance
Theory.” Philosophy of Science 39 (1): 32–50.
Krauthammer, Charles. 2016. “The GOP’s Ideological Earthquake and the
Aftermath.” National Review Online. May 5. http:\\www.nationalreview.
com\article\435045\donald- trump- not- conservative- gop- doesnt- care
(January 1, 2017).
Krosnick, Jon A. 1991. “The Stability of Political Preferences: Comparisons
of Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Attitudes.” American Journal of Political
Science 35 (3): 547–576.
Kuklinski, James H. and Paul J. Quirk. 2000. “Reconsidering the Rational
Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion.” In: Elements of Rea-
son: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality. Ed. by Arthur
Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Kuklinski, James H., Paul J. Quirk, Jennifer Jerit, and Robert F. Rich. 2001.
“The Political Environment and Citizen Competence.” American Journal
of Political Science 45 (2): 410–424.
Kunda, Ziva. 1990. “The Case for Motivated Reasoning.” Psychological Bul-
letin 108 (3): 480–498.
Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang. 1966. “The Mass Media and Voting.” In:
Reader in Public Opinion and Communication. Ed. by Bernard Berelson
and Morris Janowitz. New York: Free Press.
Lau, Richard R. 2003. “Models of Decision Making.” In: Oxford Handbook of
Political Psychology. Ed. by David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert
Jervis. New York: Oxford University Press.
118
Lau, Richard R. and David P. Redlawsk. 2006. How Voters Decide: Informa-
tion Processing during Election Campaigns. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Lavine, Howard G., Christopher D. Johnston, and Marco R. Steenbergen.
2012. The Ambivalent Partisan: How Critical Loyalty Promotes Democ-
racy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Layman, Geoffrey C. and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. “Party Polarization and
‘Conflict Extension’ in the American Electorate.” American Journal of
Political Science 46 (4): 786–802.
Leeper, Thomas J. 2014. Are Stronger Opinions More Stable? Presented at
the 72nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, IL.
Lenz, Gabriel S. 2012. Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians’
Policies and Performance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levendusky, Matthew S. 2010. “Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A
Benefit of Elite Polarization.” Political Behavior 32 (1): 111–131.
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F.
Weisberg. 2008. The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press.
Limbaugh, Rush. 2016. “We’re Beyond Ideology, Folks” The Rush Limbaugh
Show. September 15. http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2016/09/15/
we re beyond ideology folks (January 1, 2017).
Linder, Fridolin. 2015. “Misreporting of Ideological Placement Through Con-
sistency Bias.” Presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Lodge, Milton and Charles S. Taber. 2013. The Rationalizing Voter. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Lord, Charles G., Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper. 1979. “Biased Assimila-
tion and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Sub-
sequently Considered Evidence.” Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 37 (11): 2098–2109.
Lupia, Arthur. 1994. “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Vot-
ing Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections.” American Polit-
ical Science Review 88 (1): 63–76.
MacArthur, John R. 2016. “Hillary Clinton Is Not the Progressive She Claims
to Be.” Toronto Star. June 19. https : / / www . thestar . com / opinion /
commentary/2016/02/25/hillary- clinton- is- not- the- progressive- she-
claims-to-be.html (January 1, 2017).
119
Macdonald, Stuart Elaine, George Rabinowitz, and Ola Listhaug. 1995. “Po-
litical Sophistication and Models of Issue Voting.” British Journal of Po-
litical Science 25 (4): 453–483.
Malhotra, Neil and Alexander Tahk. 2011. “Specification Issues in Assessing
the Moderating Role of Issue Importance: A Comment on Grynaviski and
Corrigan (2006).” Political Analysis 19 (3): 342–350.
Manza, Jeff and Fay Lomax Cook. 2002. “A Democratic Polity? Three Views
of Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion in the United States.” Amer-
ican Politics Research 30 (6): 630–667.
Markus, Gregory B. 1988. “The Impact of Personal and National Economic
Conditions on the Presidential Vote: A Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis.”
American Journal of Political Science 32 (1): 137–154.
Markus, Gregory B. and Philip E. Converse. 1979. “A Dynamic Simultaneous
Equation Model of Electoral Choice.” American Political Science Review
73 (4): 1055–1070.
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
McChesney, Fred. 2007. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction,
and Political Extortion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Appendix A: Question Wordings
For each survey, the first item is presented with question wordings for all
questions about that item – self-placement, candidate placements, and (ex-
cept for the 1976 PCIV) importance rating. For subsequent items, only the
text unique to that issue scale is provided.
1976 Presidential Campaign Impact on Voters (PCIV) study
Busing
Now, we are going to do some scales on a number of political
issues. You will be using them in much the same way as the
previous scales.
Some people think achieving racial integration of schools is so im-
portant that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own
neighborhoods. Others thing letting children go to their neigh-
borhood schools is so important that they oppose busing.
Which number on the scale would best describe your feelings on
this issue or haven’t you thought much about it?
Where would you place (CANDIDATE) on this scale or don’t you
know about his position?
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Jobs
As a way to reduce unemployment, most people feel the govern-
ment should help business to prosper so that more jobs are cre-
ated. But people have different opinions about the government
directly providing jobs. Some people want a federal job program,
where the government directly provides jobs to those who cannot
otherwise find employment. Others do not want the government
directly to provide jobs to those out of work.
Defense
Some people think our military strength has diminished in com-
parison to Russia and that much more must be spent on planes,
ships, and weapons to build a stronger defense. Others feel that
our military defense is adequate and that no increase in military
spending is currently necessary.
Inflation
Some people feel that the government should take direct action
to control wages and prices so that inflation can be kept in check.
Others think that government control of wages and prices is not
the way to deal with inflation.
Crime
Some people emphasize tougher laws and longer jail sentences to
deal with the high crime rate in this country. Others emphasize
trying to solve problems of poverty and unemployment that turn
some people to crime.
Foreign Policy
Some people feel that America must be willing, except for the
use of military force, to become deeply involved in the internal
affairs of other countries when it seems necessary. Others feel




There is a lot of talk these days about the level of spending by the
federal government for social welfare programs. Some people feel
that the current level of social welfare spending is necessary be-
cause almost everyone receiving this government help really needs
it. Others feel a great deal of this social welfare spending is wasted
because a lot of people receiving this government help don’t de-
serve it.
Abortion
Some people favor legalized abortion, that is, they feel that a
woman who desires an abortion should be able to have one. Other
people are against legalized abortion.
Taxes
Most everyone favors a cut in personal income taxes, but there is
disagreement about the nature of a tax cut. Some people want
a tax cut that is intended to benefit all income groups about the
same. Other people want a tax cut that is intended to benefit
modest and low income groups much more than it benefits the
high income groups.
Issue Importance Rankings
These yellow cards list the issues we’ve just talked about. We
want to get an idea of the importance to you of these issues.
Please sort the cards into the most important issues to you, those
that are somewhat important, and the least important to you.
Put three cards in each category.
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1980 American National Election Studies (ANES) Panel Study
Defense
Some people believe that we should spend much less money for
defense. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point
number 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly
increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point
7. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in
between at point 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you
thought much about this?
Where would you place (CANDIDATE)?
You placed yourself at point (NUMBER) and what the govern-
ment is doing at point (NUMBER). Using the blue card (showing
scale from 000-100), tell me: how important is it that the govern-
ment (continue what it is doing so that it stays close to/change
what it is doing so that it comes closer to) your own position on
this issue?
Spending
Some people think the government should provide fewer services,
even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce
spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to
continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction
in spending.
Russia
Some people feel it is important for us to try very hard to get
along with Russia. Others feel it is a big mistake to try too hard
to get along with Russia.
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Inflation
Some people feel the federal government should take action to
reduce the inflation rate, even if it means that unemployment
would go up a lot. Others feel the government should take action
to reduce the rate of unemployment, even if it means that inflation
would go up a lot.
2008-2009 American National Election Studies (ANES) Panel Study
Same-Sex Marriage
(Do you/does (CANDIDATE)) favor, oppose, or neither favor nor
oppose an amendment to the U.S. Constitution banning marriage
between two people who are the same sex?
(Do you/does (CANDIDATE)) [favor/oppose] that (a great deal,
moderately, or a little / a little, moderately, or a great deal?)
Taxes
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose raising federal
income taxes for people who make more than $200,000 per year?
Prescription Drugs
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. gov-
ernment paying for all of the cost of prescription drugs for senior
citizens who are living on very little income?
Healthcare
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. gov-
ernment paying for all necessary medical care for all Americans?
Detention
Imagine that the U.S. government suspects a person in the United
States of being a terrorist. Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor
nor oppose the government being able to put this person in prison
for months without ever bringing the person to court and charging
him or her with a crime?
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Wiretaps
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. gov-
ernment being required to get a court order before it can listen in
on phone calls made by American citizens who are suspected of
being terrorists?
Work Visas
Citizens of other countries who have come to live in the United
States without the permission of the U.S. government are called
“illegal immigrants.”
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing illegal
immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years,
after which they would have to go back to their home country?
Illegal Immigration
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. gov-
ernment making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S.
citizens?
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Appendix B: Process Measurement
Calculations
To estimate the amount of perceived spatial inconsistency reduction at-
tributable to each motivated reasoning process (persuasion, assimilation,
contrast, and reprioritization) I calculated how much perceived spatial in-
consistency would have been reduced if only the variables affected by the
process in question (issue positions, preferred candidate perceptions, non-
preferred candidate perceptions, and issue importance ratings, respectively)
had changed. This was done according to the following procedure:
 Calculate how much changing the variables in question would have
reduced perceived spatial inconsistency if all other variables were held
constant at their initial values (when t = 1).
 Calculate how much changing the variables in question would have
reduced perceived spatial inconsistency if all other variables were held
constant at their final values (when t = 2).
 Average the two calculations. If the result is positive (indicating an
increase in perceived spatial inconsistency), the process is treated as
having contributed zero to the overall reduction in cognitive dissonance.
These process amount calculations are presented formally below. Vi1 and
Vi2 indicate the voter’s self-placements in the summer and fall, respectively;
similar expressions are used for preferred candidate placements (Pi1 and Pi2),
non-preferred candidate placements (Ni1 and Ni2), and issue importance rat-





























































































































































((Vi2 − Pi2)× Ii1)2 −
√∑
((Vi2 −Ni2)× Ii1)2
))
/2
(B.7)
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